Techeiles 2 – Eilu V’Eilu and Two Watches

Author’s note – This post is Part 2 of a multi-part analysis of the integrity of the teachings of Chazal. It is a response to the assertion made by Rav Yisroel Reisman, shlita about whether or not to accept the Murex Trunculus snail as a candidate for the Talmudic Techeiles. Please see Part 1 HERE.

In our previous post, we noted that Chazal mean what they say and they do not distinguish between basic Halacha, details of Biblical or historical events, or scientific facts. We must rely on what they tell us. Such a task may not be so difficult if Chazal were totally consistent with themselves and when the facts they present are within reason and are supported by what we can observe. Yet, the truth is that the teachings of Chazal are full of inconsistencies. Some of these inconsistencies can be explained away or readily shrugged off. But some others leave us in no-man’s-land.

The inconsistencies that I want to discuss in this post come in three varieties:

·         Girsaos – textual discrepancies

·         Machlokes – disputes or differences of opinion among the sages

·         S’tiros – contradictions

All of these varieties enforce a witty remark that I once heard in my Yeshiva years and have never forgotten:

The man with one watch knows the time; the man with two watches is always in doubt!

Girsaos

Before we can try to understand what Chazal are telling us, we need to know precisely what they said. This can be a bigger challenge than we think.

The statements and stories of Chazal are often repeated several times throughout Jewish literature. In some cases there are several versions in Talmud Bavli. In some cases, there may be a similar passage in Bavli and another in Yerushalmi. Or sometimes a matching passage to Talmud Bavli is found in Misdrash Rabba or Tanchuma or Yalkut Shimoni. Of course there is the concise Pirkei Avos and the “expanded” Avos D’Rabi Nosson. Rarely are the statements totally identical. In many cases, an identical (or almost identical) passage is repeated in two places attributed to two different authors.

Before we go into Chazals that are doubled or tripled, even ones that have a single appearance in shas or Midrash can be fraught with discrepancies. Firstly, we know that Shas Bavli itself has gone through much repeat editing through the generations. There are words and phrases in older copies that do not appear in the current copies. The old copies of shas have corrections right there in the margins from the Bach, Gr”a, Reshash, Ein Mishpat, Maharav Ranshberg, and Shita Mekubetzes to name a few. More recent, updated copies of shas usually have sections in the back for “Dikdukei Sofrim” – editor’s corrections – or “Shinui Nushchaos” – text variations. 

To add to the confusion, all of the Aggadic material in Talmud Bavli was compiled into a “free standing” collection we call Ein Yaakov. In theory, it should just be a copy/paste from the Gemara.  Alas, there was no copy/paste before 1980, so this work was done manually. And so, we find hundreds if not thousands of nuance variations in the Ein Yaakov version of the very  Talmud Bavli that it came from!

Lastly, and most “annoying” in this category is that all through the writings of the Rishonim, they are quoting passages from the Talmud. Even where we know of no other text variation, we find Rishonim who quote the text slightly differently from our current version. And we wonder: Are they accurately quoting the girsa they had in their personal copy of Talmud or are they quoting verbatim and being a little sloppy?

I can fill volumes with examples but, for this post and in the girsaos category I will limit myself to two examples. The first example goes back to a discrepancy between what we think are three instances of the same Chazal in three places in Shas – Sanhedrin 22a, Sota 2a, and Moed Kattan 18b – where Chazal pronounce the immortal words: “Bas ploni l’ploni”. I wrote an entire post about this in the Shidduchim series titled Barshert is Barshert. No?

I noted that in Sota and Sanhedrin, the text is virtually identical. Actually, the only difference that I found was that in our Shas the term in Sota is “zug rishon” and “zug sheini” and in Sanhedrin it says “zivug rishon” and “zivug sheini”. In Ein Yaakov, you will find the term “zivug” in both places. But the version in Moed Kattan is very different. Firstly, it attributes the statement to Rav Yehuda amar Shmuel as opposed to Rav Yehuda amar Rav. More important, it does not say that this bas kol comes out after 40 days but on each and every day.

Are we dealing with two conflicting versions of the same statement for which we are not sure if this originated with Rav or with Shmuel, or are they two different statements, one stated by Rav and one stated by Shmuel? If the latter, is Rav arguing with Shmuel? What is their dispute and why don’t they agree?

I examined all of these possibilities in my post, you can check out my conclusions there.

And why is this so important?

Because the entire issue of whether there is such a thing as a “barshert” for a girl rides on this discrepancy!

The second example of text discrepancy relates to my last variation – where the Rishonim do not seem to quote the Talmud as we have it written. And who is the guilty party in this example?

Rabban Shel Yisrael ­­– Rashi!

At the end of Parshat Balak, Rashi gives us his commentary on the episode with Zimri ben Saleu. In Bamidbar 25:6 Rashi writes the details: 

The tribe of Shimon converged upon Zimri and said to him: We are being judged for death and you are just sitting…as is related in HaNisrafim (Sanhedrin 82).

Rashi in Chumash is specifically referring us to the account recorded in Sanhedrin 82 and everything is just dandy... as long as one does not actually look up Sanhedrin 82. But if he does, he may notice some very innocent looking differences. The first is very trivial. It does not say the tribesmen “converged” upon Zimri but that they simply “went” to Zimri. Not very important but it diminishes the drama just a drop. But the other discrepancy jumps out at us. It does not say “We are being judged for death…” but rather “They are judging capital judgments…”

This may look like two ways of saying the same thing, but there is much room to give different interpretations on the two different versions. Here, as well, once upon a time, I wrote a very lengthy essay on the Zimri incident (not available on my blog) and I pointed out this discrepancy and what the ramification may be. It is too involved for this post (if interested, you can contact me privately to learn more), but one thing is certain - Rashi is clearly misquoting the gemara, and we must wonder why.

Did Rashi do this on purpose? Is it possible that Rashi did not have a copy of Sanhedrin available and was writing the text from memory and simply made a mistake? Can someone as great as Rashi make a mistake? Is it possible that Rashi had  different girsa in the text of Sanhedrin? If so, why did he not mention it in the gemara itself? Is Rashi in Chumash purposely changing the girsa to his own version? Why???

Trust me, this is by no means a lone occurrence in Rashi. It’s a bit endemic. In Devarim 20:3 Rashi comments on the term Shma Yisrael that is declared by the Kohen before a military campaign: 

Even if you have no merit other than Kriat Shma you are worthy that HKBH will save you.

This is attributed to the gemara in Sota 42a only there it says: 

Even if you only fulfilled Kriat Shma morning and night, you will not be submitted into their hands.

Is the gemara insisting that one at least fulfills Kriat Shma twice a day each day and is Rashi lowering the requirement to just once in one’s lifetime? By what authority does Rashi make this change? Or, if Rashi means precisely the same as the gemara, why is his terminology different?

This can make a world of difference to a chiloni in the IDF!

The point of all of this is to assert that when there is more than one source for a statement, it is like having two watches. And even when there is just one source, there is always a chance that the passage of Chazal that you read is different than the original passage that they wrote!

Machlokes

The confusion we get with girsa problems is not intentional. They are due to inaccurate transmission from master to student (game of broken telephone), mistakes and human error. It’s like we own one watch and then we just find a second one.

We get just as confused when there is absolutely no issue with the text accuracy. It is when Chazal simply do not agree with each other. It’s like inviting all your uncles to your bar mitzvah and being handed a watch by each one of them. Worse, it’s like one uncle giving you two watches!

The concept of three Jews and 30 opinions is iconic to Torah observant Jews. It is deeply rooted in our tradition. Almost every Halachic nuance is couched in Machlokes. Machlokes Tanayim, Machlokes Amorayim, Machlokes Rishonim, Achronim, Poskim, etc.  It is in our blood. So much so, that a machlokes in “what happened?” is just as natural as a machlokes in “what is the Halacha?”

I may be the only one, but I find such types of machlokes (the "what happened?" ones) a little bit disturbing.

Halacha is one thing because Halacha is philosophy. It is quite normal and natural for different folks to think differently. כשם שפרצופיהם שונים כך דעותיהם שונות. Just as every individual looks unique, every individual thinks uniquely. And all the opinions can be equally valid. אלו ואלו דברי א-לקים חיים!

Of course, we cannot allow different Halachos unique for each individual in a cohesive social environment so we must establish guidelines to determine which Halachic opinions prevail for society at large, regardless of whether it sits well with the individual. So machlokes in Halacha doesn’t bother us. 

In fact, we appreciate the machlokes because it validates our uniqueness. Any individual can tell himself that even if the established Halacha does not fit my viewpoint, there are authorities who support my viewpoint which makes it valid. Actually, when it comes to monetary cases, we may actually hold that each side is Halachically valid. This is what created the monstrous Kim Li that drives all tov’im mad and was the subject of a recent post.

But the Aggadita that discusses historical events and natural sciences are quite another thing. This is not philosophy but purported fact. If there is no agreement among our sages as to what are the facts, then none of the facts can be relied on as being valid.

If two watches are not synchronized, we cannot rely that either one is accurate.

Here is an excerpt of a post that I wrote ten years ago regarding the list of Tzaddikim who never died an earthly death:

Although we live and breathe the words of Chazal, we cannot always consider their statements to be conclusive because they are often subject to conflicting Midrashim or a range of opinions among Chazal themselves. To point out a few examples, on the same page I note that there are at least 3 opinions as to which shevet produced Eliyahu HaNavi. The contention that he is a Cohen and that he is Pinchas is compromised thereby. Also, see footnote 25 on page 102 (in my book) where I bring conflicting sources as to which tzadikkim were born circumcised including a head-on collision concerning Bilaam. Another example is a controversy as to whether Zimri was actually Shlumiel ben Tzurishadai which contradicts a Midrash that all of the original nesiim died in the maaseh Korach (according to Rabbenu Bechaye). There are numerous other examples of this. 

One of the wildest "other examples" is the long sugya in Bava Basra 15a-b. Who was Iyov and when did he live?

Opinions range from Jewish to non-Jewish, from the days of Yaakov (he was husband of Dina), to the days of Moshe, the days of the Shoftim, Nevuchadnetzer, Achashverosh, that he was from the returnees of Ezra and had a Yeshiva in Teveria and, finally, that he never existed and is only a fable.

Each "contestant" presents his scriptural reference but, of course, each one’s reference is passed over by all the other opinions. Each individual opinion turns out to be an overwhelming minority. So, at the end of the daf/day, where do we stand on this? Who was Iyov? When did he live?

How many “watches” do we need?

And how are we supposed to respect all of the scriptural references when they are overlooked and “contradicted” by everyone else’s scriptural references?

The same goes for the identity of the fruit of the Eitz Hada'as. Talmud Bavli quotes a Braitha in two places (with several minor text discrepancies) which present three opinions:

• Rabi Meir - A vine, because wine and alcohol is the source of all of our woes.
• Rabi Nechemiah - A fig tree, because from the instrument of downfall comes the remedy.
• Rabi Yehuda - A wheat stalk, because ­– says Rabi Yehuda on his own with no supporting source – a child will not begin to speak until he has tasted from grain.

The gemara itself does not suggest an Esrog. This is only in Midrash Rabba. But a thorough look there will send us straight to the wine cabinet.

Firstly, in Midrash Rabba, Rabi Meir is the one who suggests wheat, not Rabi Yehuda. Then comes Rabi Yehuda and he suggests grapes. This is a total reversal of credits. He also backs it up with a pasuk (Devarim 32:32), not just a concept. After this comes Rabi Abba from Acco who suggests the Esrog, and running fourth, Rabi Yosi (not Rabi Nechemia) is credited with the fig opinion.

This is as much as most of us know. The Midrash continues a bit further with two more suggestions that we are not familiar with­ – a “brat sheva” and a “brat alita”. But then comes the part that most of us never heard, but we should:

Rabi Azaria…in the name of Rabi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Chas v’shalom! HKBH has not revealed the type of tree to Man and will not do so in the future! See what it says that if a woman sins with a beast, the beast is likewise executed. Why so? So that it (the beast) should not later pass through the public domain and people will say that this beast was the one that brought about the execution of so and so. And if HKBH is concerned to preserve the dignity of the offspring of Adam HaRishon, certainly it is concerned to preserve his dignity.

Now, this sounds very reasonable to me, but evidently, Rabi Meir, Rabi Yehuda, Rabi Nechemiah/Yosi, and Rabi Abba of Acco do not agree with this and they think that it is important to know what type of tree the Eitz Hadaas was. So, if somebody asks any of us right now, “What type of tree was the Eitz Hada'as?”, what will be our answer?

Incidentally, there is a shita from Rav Amram Gaon that it was a nut tree (egoz) and many understand the Ibn Ezra (Breishis 3:6) to hold that it was a unique one-of-a-kind aphrodisiac fruit tree (Viagra?) which cannot be found anywhere else on earth (though they haven’t stopped looking for it). The Ibn Ezra actually refers to some of the popular opinions and argues with their premise. Can a Rishon argue with a Tanna?

Well, as long as other Tannaim are arguing with this Tanna, then why can’t we?

Personally, if I had a vote, I would suggest a coffee tree because the pasuk says: And the eyes of both of them opened and they realized that they weren’t dressed…

All of this implies that learning the identity of the fruit of the Eitz Hada'as is merely an academic exercise but, nevertheless, something that we cannot hope to be conclusive about. And certainly nothing that we can build Halacha around. Yet, the gemara in Brachos 40a indicates otherwise.

The gemara wants to understand the intent of the Mishna that says if one inadvertently recites Borei pri ha’eitz on a vegetable that the Bracha is invalid. Isn’t this obvious? The only answer the gemara can present is that the intention of this Halachic Mishna is to reject the opinion of Rabi Yehuda that claims the Eitz Hada'as was wheat. This would indicate that if one wishes to eat raw wheat, he is allowed to recite Borei pri ha’eitz since, according to Rabi Yehuda, the Torah calls a wheat stalk “eitz”.

Yes, indeed, Chazal take their Aggadic literature very seriously.

S’tiros

So now, after dealing with textual discrepancies and cases where Chazal themselves present multiple opinions within a given passage, we need to discuss cases where one passage of Chazal flatly contradicts another and is not presented as a machlokes.

Of course, these things happen in Halacha all through Shas. The gemara usually settles it in one of two ways: Ha Mani (who is the author of this Halacha?) and Hacha B’mai Askinan (in what kind of case are we dealing here as opposed to the original case?).

Ha mani is essentially telling us that even though we did not know there is a machlokes on this issue, we have now learned that there is. Hacha b’mai askinan forces us to make a modification in one of the contradictory cases to make a distinction between the two, thus essentially solving the contradiction by saying that they are two different scenarios and the Halacha changes from one to the other.

Here again, the second approach will work with philosophy of Halacha but cannot work with facts or events. Sometimes we can resolve the contradiction by finding some middle ground between the two contradictory passages, which usually challenges some of our assumptions and mitigates the impact of the maamar Chazal. But other times, there is no way to reconcile and we must dig up who is the author of this Aggadita versus the other and declare that they differ (back to machlokes) or that these two pieces just do not get along.

It’s like solving the contradiction of two watches by saying that neither is right and the true time is somewhere in between or by saying that one of them is definitely right and the other wrong but you are not sure which one.

One of my favorite examples is staring us in the face in Taanis 23a. At the top of the page the gemara describes the meaning of “gishmeichem b’itam” – rains in their proper time – to mean that it will rain regularly only on Wednesday nights and Friday nights. The gemara backs up this description by a case example: 

And so we find in the days of Shimon ben Shetach that the rains fell on Wednesday nights and Friday nights and the crops grew until the wheat was like kidneys, barley like olives and lentils like gold coins…

The impression that I took form this gemara is that this was the standard rainfall all through the tenure of Shimon ben Shetach. Similar to the gemara (Kesubos 77b) that there were no rainbows in “the days” of Rabi Yehoshuah ben Levi (and Rabi Shimon Ben Yochai). His generation was especially righteous. They fulfilled Im bechukosai telechu with all the mitzvos and ameilus b’Torah, so they got “gishmeichem b’itam”.

But, further down on the very same daf, in a seemingly unrelated sugya, we see the famous story of Choni Hame’agel. There was a drought and the nation called upon Choni who was the Baba Sali of the generation. He drew a circle and declared that he will not step out of the circle unless it rains. Sure enough, his entreaties were answered. Although Choni was the kadosh or mekubal of the generation and a miracle worker, he was not the Nasi. And the Nasi called him out for his brazenness. And, who was the Nasi? Says the gemara:

Shimon ben Shetach sent to him: If it weren’t that you are the holy Choni, I would decree upon you a nidui…but, what can I do? You are like a bratty child who fools around in front of his father and yet his father pampers his child…

So there was a severe drought in the times of Shimon ben Shetach? So severe that they needed to call upon a baal mofes to get them out of it? But wasn’t it such a righteous generation of Im becukosia telechu and timely rains and enormous crops?

Well, of course we can easily dismiss this contradiction by saying that my initial assumption was incorrect. The timely rains did not occur constantly throughout his tenure as the Nasi, but rather it was a one-time occurrence that happened sometime during his term. But, yet, I am taken aback by two things: (1) I have yet to find a single commentator that even notices this ambiguity and (2) the polar extremities of these two episodes.  Perhaps we can explain the second point by saying that that generation was ruled by a midas hadin so their devout years were rewarded very handsomely and their sinful years were punished very severely.

The interesting thing is that this Aggadic lesson about the timely rains is likewise incorporated into a Halachic discussion in Chullin 119b about whether the peels or shells of produce are counted when determining their size for tumaas ochlin. Once again, Chazal take their Aggadic lessons very seriously.

The next contradiction is a more serious one and I covered it in this post about Who received Eretz Yisrael directly after the flood? Once again our culprit is Rashi who generally bases his commentary of chumash on the words of Chazal.Here is what I wrote there:

To summarize, the Talmud Bavli, Rashi in Breishis 1:1, and the Chumash in Breishis 10:9 all seem to indicate that Cham was the original legitimate sovereign of Eretz Israel. Yet, Rashi here (Breishis 12:6) insists that Shem initially inhabited it and Cham stole it from him!

Who was here first?

This makes quite a difference if you are trying to explain our claim to Eretz Yisroel on some liberal college campus.

I noted in that post the great commentator on Rashi, Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi, a later Rishon, threw up his hands in despair. I wrote:

Numerous commentators make note of this contradiction and at the forefront is Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi (RE"M) who makes a note of it in all three spots (Breishis 1:1 and 12:6 and Bamidbar 13:22). And he repeats the same mantra throughout: These are contradictory aggadoth and Rashi acknowledges both. In Breishis 1:1 he points out that Rashi is prone to doing this in multiple instances in Chumash.

So we learn here that the RE”M concedes that not every internal conflict in Chazal can be answered. We must come to terms with the fact that, despite our mantra of Eilu v’Eilu divrei elokim chaim, reality cannot support both versions. They cannot both be “what happened”.

Incidentally, I did find a way to reconcile the contradictory aggadot in that post, but I was only able to do so by taking the Rashi in Breishis 12:6 out of its simple meaning and to say that the sons of Cham did not conquer Eretz Yisroel by force but by license from the sons of Shem.

The next contradiction that I want to discuss brings us back to the story of Achitofel that we mentioned in our initial post as well as our multiple personality disorder about Iyov that I discussed earlier in this post.

We may be familiar with the gemara in Sanhedrin 106a that says: Three people were involved in that council (to enslave the Jews in Egypt) – Iyov, Yisro, and Bilaam. Iyov was silent, Yisro bolted, and Bilaam stayed and voted for enslavement.  This was about 140 years before the Exodus (after the passing of Yosef). Even if we place Bilaam at 13 years old then, he would be no less than 193 years old at the time of the war with Midian in which he died.

Now, let’s recall our previous post where we mentioned that the premise to say that Achitofel was only 33 years old at his death comes from a pasuk in Tehillim 55 which says that “murderous deceitful people will not live to half of a [normal] lifetime” (a normal lifetime is 70 years). We understand that these chapters in Tehillim were written by Dovid Hamelech about his arch enemies, Doeg and Achitofel (according to the Braitha, Doeg made it to 34).

But at the top of Sanhedrin 106b, where Rabi Chanina is responding to the inquiry of a heretic, he applies this pasuk to Bilaam, as well, and continues on to claim that Bilaam died in his early 30s. (Incidentally, Bilaam was not on Dovid’s wanted list and is not included in the Braitha about Achitofel.) The heretic supported Rabi Chanina's “drush” by saying that he himself saw a protocol that confirms Bilaam’s age at 33 at when he was killed by "Pinchas the marauder". Hence, Bilaam would be much too young to have been an adviser to Pharaoh 180 years earlier. He would even be too young to have lived during mattan Torah (39 years earlier) and this contradicts the gemara in Zevachim 116a that says he was there. 

Both of these claims – the 193 or so years of age and the 33 years of age – are in Sanhedrin 106 so it’s very difficult to overlook this contradiction. And, sure enough, Rashi on the spot takes it on.  Rashi seems to have no way out except to say that the first statement (193) was said by Rav Simai and the current statement (33) was said by Rabi Chanina and never the twain shall meet.

Once again, this leaves us 21^st century dwarfs in limbo. Should we take this story about Bilaam advising Pharaoh seriously or not? Rav Simai is a card-carrying member of Chazal and he says, Yes. But Rabi Chanina is likewise a card-carrying member of Chazal and he says, No. We revere and cherish them both.

Rashi finds no way to reconcile the two opinions, like to say that perhaps, Rabi Chanina agrees to Rav Simai but he was talking to the mindset of the heretic.  Or perhaps to say there was more than one Bilaam just as there was more than one Pharaoh (or more than one Nimrod) - Bilaam Sr. and Bilaam Jr.  Of course, both of these explanations are “stretches” (like Batya’s arm), but if we do not use them, we are left wearing two watches.

We would love to put our full trust in Chazal [believe all is binding] and believe that if Chazal tell us that Bilaam was 33 when he died, then he was 33 when he died. We would likewise love to trust Chazal and believe that if Chazal tell us that Bilaam was one of three advisors to Pharaoh 140 years prior to the Exodus, then Bilaam was one of three advisors to Pharaoh 140 years prior to the Exodus. But both cannot be true.

Rashi says so.

We can only conclude, as Rashi indicates, that members of Chazal did not always agree or support the other’s opinion and we are forced to discount at least some of the descriptions of Chazal as not binding. We are like children who watch their parents fight. We can convince ourselves that both are right but we cannot fully trust either one.

My final entry (for this post) is the contradiction about Ruth’s nationality. This was the topic of a blog post back in Sept of 2008 (wow, ten years!). Here are the facts of the contradiction as I wrote it then (nothing has changed):

·       Rashi in BaMidbar (22:4) quotes a Midrash Tanchuma that claims that Balak was actually Midyani.

·       Talmud Bavli (Sotah 47a and three other places) maintains that Balak was a direct ancestor of Ruth and two places indicate the ancestry to be directly patrilineal.

·       In Yevamos 78b and Rambam (Hilchos Issurei Biah 12:21) it is ruled that for non-Jews, nationhood is determined by patrilineal ancestry.

·       Therefore, Ruth actually has the Halachic status of a Midyani and not Moavi. This means that there would be no grounds for the controversy during the time of Boaz if Ruth is fit to convert and again when Doeg HaAdomi challenged Dovid's legitimacy (Yevamos 76b). This would also negate Ruth’s bloodline to Lot which is taken for granted by Chazal (Bava Kamma 38b; Midrash Rabba Breishis 41, 50).

The post concluded that there is no comfortable way to solve this contradiction. The easy way out is like the Rashi in Sanhedrin 106 and Rabbenu Mizrachi - the maamarei Chazal argue with each other. Only Talmud Bavli says that Ruth descended from Balak. Midrash Tanchuma does not say so. Only Tanchuma says that Balak was Midyani, Talmud Bavli does not say so. 

So we can easily say that Talmud Bavli does not agree with Midrash Tanchuma, but of course, this brings us back to not being able to trust either watch –or either “parent”. If you refer to the post, you will find a few other possible solutions, but all of them carry some sacrifice on our desire to view the words of Chazal as literal and immutable.

And so we conclude Part 2 of the Techeiles discussion. In Part 1, we learned how seriously Chazal respect the statements of their “members”. In Part 2, we have learned that not all of their members say the same thing and their tendency to accept all of these statements so literally and seriously is what makes the contradictions so difficult to solve.

We are not done yet. Stay tuned for more…