Major Extradition vs. Minor Extradition

 

Parshat Ki Teitzeh is upon us. This parshah is the last trove of essential mitzvos that we find before completing the Torah. One rather obscure prohibition that we find in this parshah (Devarim 23:16) is one that I have discussed at length throughout many a post:

לא תסגיר עבד אל אדוניו

You may not return a [runaway] slave to the custody of his current master.

What does this mean?

The Gemara in Gittin 45a explains that this law is referring to a Canaani slave that is owned by a proper Jew who lives outside of Eretz Yisrael. Whereupon, the slave fled from his master and took refuge in Eretz Yisrael. The pasuk is telling us that the Jewish authorities are forbidden to return the slave to his rightful master outside of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, they force the master to release the slave and the slave is required to reimburse the master for his market value.

Rambam in Sefer Mitzvos Lavim 254 explains why the slave is freed:

כיון שבא להסתופף בארץ הטהורה הנבחרת לעם הנעלה.

Since he wanted to be added into the pure land that was chosen for the exalted nation.

Sefer Chinuch (568) explains it slightly differently:

שרצה האל לכבוד הארץ שהבורח לשם ינצל מעבדות, כדי שניתן אל לבנו כבוד המקום, ונקבע בלבבנו בהיותנו שם יראת ה’ יתעלה. וכל זה להועיל לעמו ולזכותם כי חפץ חסד הוא.

 

That HKBH desired, for the honor of the land, that one who flees to there shall be spared from servitude. This is so we will take heart the honor of the place (Eretz Yisrael) and establish fear of the High G-d in our hearts when we are there. And all this is to benefit his nation and to confer merit on us for HKBH desires kindness.

The pirush of Chumash Torah Temimah explains that nobody should be forced to reside outside of Eretz Yisrael since it is a place of impurity and idolatry. One who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael is as if he has no G-d.

The astonishing thing is that this mitzva is referring to one who was not born Jewish and did not undergo a full conversion. He is only a quasi-Jew. He is not eligible to marry a Jewish woman. Yet, the Torah is expressly commanding to uphold his desire to live in Eretz Yisrael. Note – Upon being released, he is required to undergo a full conversion and keep all the mitzvos so, at the end of the day, we are indeed gaining a full-fledged Jew. Still, this status only comes after the mitzvah to release him takes effect, not before, and still he is protected.

We can deduce by kal v’chomer that this mitzva is no less applicable to any regular, full-fledged Jew. Certainly, all the reasons stated by the Rishonim apply even more to a natural born Jew.

If so, why did the Torah seem to single out a slave for this mitzvah?

One obvious answer is to show us how far the kavod of Eretz Yisrael extends. It extends not only to a regular Jew but even to a quasi-Jew. But a more practical answer is that it is already a capital crime to forcibly relocate (kidnap) a free Jew from point A to point B even if both points are in Eretz Yisrael. This is known as gonev nefesh m'Yisrael. The only type of person that “we” are authorized to transport is a person who is the rightful property of somebody else. This would be a Canaanite slave. But it definitely applies to all Jews in the strange cases where it could apply, such as criminal extradition.

In case you have doubts, just check out Midrash Rabbah Breishis 94 (Vayigash). Here is what it says:

At the time that Nevuchadnetzer came up to conquer Yehoyakim (King of Judah), he settled by the walls of Antioch. The Great Sanhedrin approached to meet him and they asked him, “Has the time come for this house (Temple) to be destroyed?”.

 

He answered, “Not yet, but King Yehoyakim rebelled against me. Hand him over to me and I will go [in peace].” This implied that if he didn’t get the king, things won’t be very peaceful.

 

They went and told King Yehoyakim that Nevuchadnetzer issued an arrest warrant for him (i.e., he should turn himself in for the sake of peace.) He told them, “Is this the right thing to do, to sacrifice one soul for the sake of another? Does the Torah not say ‘One may not reintern a slave back to his master’?” They responded, “Didn’t your own grandfather do the same to Sheva ben Bichri?” (Sheva ben Bichri was a wanted murderer whose crimes were known to all - YH.)

What do we see from this?

Yehoyakim was not only a full-fledged Jew but he was a Davidic King, no less. A King! And he argued that this mitzva concerning a Canaani slave applies to his case. And he would have been correct if not for the proviso that he had the status of Sheva ben Bichri. Clearly, this law is not limited to a slave.

This explanation of the mitzvah is the mainstream one. It is spelled out in the Gemara in Gittin and endorsed by Rambam, Chinuch, and SMa”G. It is also codified in Rambam (Avadim 8:6, 9, and 10) and in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:84,85. Shulchan Aruch goes out of its way to tell us that this law applies even in today’s times. Almost nobody entertains any other explanation of this pasuk, except...Rashi.

Rashi in Chumash likewise references the gemara in Gittin but, surprisingly, this is only his second ‘backup’ pshat. His first is to reference Targum Unkelos who wrote something a little bit different. Unkelos wrote: Do not hand over a non-Jewish slave of a non-Jewish master to that master after he ran to you for refuge.

This pshat looks to mirror the opening of the gemara in Gittin. The gemara opens with a story about a slave who ran from outside Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael and, although it isn’t said openly, the indication is that it is talking about a non-Jewish slave belonging to an idolatrous non-Jewish owner. This runaway slave is willing to swear off idolatry.

The gemara initially wants to say that such a person who swore off idolatry is permitted to remain in Israel even if he does not become Jewish. With this in mind we can say that this pasuk does not really care about location. Even if the slave ran away to a Jew in chutz l’aretz but he does not want to be forced to serve foreign gods, we are prohibited to return him to a master who will force him into idolatry. Obviously, this assumes that the local authorities do not intervene on behalf of the owner.

The gemara in Gittin subsequently rejects this explanation of Lo Tasgir and settles on the mainstream one that I mentioned earlier and that Rashi mentions last. (Rashi is a bit of a puzzle, but I suppose he has a lot of respect for Targum Unkelos who, in fact, predates the gemara.) The gemara’s first assumption (Unkelos) doesn’t make it into Shulchan Aruch, but it may still have Halachic validity. So, let’s not totally forget about it just yet.

Let’s get down to business.

The State of Israel identifies itself as the “Jewish Homeland”. As such, it is reasonable to expect that its laws should at least be modeled after traditional Jewish law.

Although the secular leftist Israeli judiciary is trying it’s hardest to divest the country of any semblance of Jewish identity, there are some areas where it just cannot be avoided. For one thing, the Jewish calendar is officially recognized as a valid dating system here in Israel. Likewise, the state recognizes the seventh day – “Saturday/Shabbat” – as the official off-day for the nation and acknowledges that it cannot legally compel those who observe Shabbos to violate it. The same applies to all Jewish holidays.

Another thing is that all matters of family and marital status – marriage, divorce, conversion, and mamzerut – are delegated to the Rabbinate. This goes so far, that the state itself will not allow for a genetic DNA test to be used to determine a case of questionable paternity that can lead to a status of mamzer unless the Rabbinate approves of it. I wrote about this at length (HERE and HERE).

More or less everything else – default monetary disputes and damages, criminal law, default inheritance, and real estate - is all governed by secular Western ideals. Sadly, this also includes extradition. The leftist Israeli law allows a full-fledged card carrying natural born Jew to be extradited away from Eretz Yisrael at the request of some other country. This is even if the accused is a full Israeli citizen. This was pivotal in the Malka Leifer episode. It is a disgrace. I have been lamenting about this for years.

So, let’s imagine that Israeli law would treat extradition like family law. Just like the court will not order a genetic test without the approval of the Rabbanut, let’s imagine that the court will not approve any extradition without the approval of the Rabbanut, as well. If this were so, I think it’s a safe bet that there is no chance that any Beis Din would approve of extradition – and mesira - for Mrs. Leifer.

A very recent incident enlightened me that there may be a second type of extradition. One that does not involve criminality or mesira. A type of a case where there can be justification to transport another human being who is not a slave from one place to another. What kind of a case?

A parental custody dispute of a minor.

A parent cannot set his small child free and send the child a bill for his market value. What if a couple had a family in chutz l”aretz and then split up. Then one side abducts a minor child and runs to Eretz Yisrael. Does Lo Tasgir apply here or not?

What if one parent is Jewish and one parent is not?

This can get very sticky. Let’s check out the story.

I saw this in a newsletter about interesting court cases (secular court). The story is in Hebrew. If you read Hebrew you can see it HERE (or use the page translation feature).

The title reads:

District Court Upholds: 6-Year-old boy abducted to Israel will be returned to his father

 

The story is about a tourist from Italy who came to Israel and got into a relationship with an Israeli woman. This “hookup” resulted in a baby boy. Evidently, the pair stayed together.

Initially they lived in Israel. After Oct. 7, they moved to Italy. They moved back to Israel in early 2024 and moved back to Italy later in 2024. Finally, in Jan. 2026, the couple split and the mother came to Israel with the now 6-year-old boy. As you may guess, the father filed kidnapping charges and demanded to forcibly send the boy back to Italy.

The mother claimed that the father is violent and attacked her on “Xmas Eve”. The father denies it. The Israeli court ruled that the mother failed to substantiate her claim of violence and that the abduction without the father’s consent or a hearing in Italy constitutes kidnapping by international law. The child must be sent back. The mother appealed in the District (Appellate) Court and was denied.

Based on standard international law and The Hague convention, the Israeli court was complying with the rules. There are no surprises here. But let’s play along with our fantasy that the Rabbanut must approve of all calls for extradition. How would they rule on this?

Of course, the first thing is to determine whether or not the child is Jewish. The story indicates that the couple celebrates Xmas. This implies that at least the Italian father is not Jewish. The mother may be Jewish, but if she is, she is very far from observance. But that shouldn’t make a difference.

Let’s examine a hypothetical case where both parents are Jewish. Yet, the father lives in Italy and the mother wants to live in Israel and she kidnapped the child to the Land of Israel. Is it the same Lo Tasgir? I noted above that a father is not a master. He cannot “free” his child.

Of course, we would need to know the standard Halachos about child custody when two estranged parents live in one country. Both live in Israel or both do not. The basic rule is that up to the age of six, all children are granted to the mother. From the age of six on, many poskim maintain that the boys should be housed by the father because a father has an obligation to teach his sons Torah.

Well and good. But now, we are discussing a father living in diaspora and a mother in Israel. If the father is an observant Jew, do his rights to custody still apply? Does the father’s obligation to teach Torah override the mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisrael? After all, we know the rule that one should not leave Eretz Yisrael except to learn Torah so, Torah learning overrides living in Israel. Or would we say there is a din of Lo Tasgir and the child must stay here and we would compel the father either to come to Israel or to relinquish custody?

Tzarich iyun gadol.

Then comes a situation where the Jewish father has no connection to learning or teaching Torah. How does this play into a standard domestic custody battle in one country? And in an multi-national one like this case, where even the father is Jewish but not observant, would we say that since this child isn’t about to be taught Torah no matter which parent he stays by, that the father can still assert his rights to take the boy out of Israel?

Teiku.

Now comes what looks to be the likely scenario here where the father is certainly not Jewish but the mother is. Hence, the child is Jewish. What would the Rabbanut do?

On the face of things, there is definitely a form of Lo Tasgir that can apply here. But still, a father is a father and the Rabbanut may not want to contest international law and the Hague Convention even at the expense of losing a Jewish Neshama.

And what if both parents are not Jewish?

This would seem to be a no-brainer. Let’s just send this Italian goy back to Italy - and the mother, too. But, wait!

According to Rashi, we have two explanations of Lo Tasgir. The second one concurs with most of the other Rishonim and the poskim that we are dealing with an Eved Canaani who wants to be free and to embrace Judaism. This certainly does not apply to a non-Jew.

But his first explanation, based on Targum Unkelos, tells us something surprising. Even if the slave is totally not Jewish, we should still offer him sanctuary to keep him away from idolatry. Perhaps, it may be contingent on his embracing Judaism, so it will not be applicable to a clueless non-Jewish six year old, but maybe it isn’t contingent.

And so, if the Rabbanut is unconcerned about defying international law and wants to follow the Halacha precisely, would it rule to block the extradition?

What would Unkelos say?

All I know is that Unkelos did not start off Jewish himself – and that he lived in Italy.

Project Emesh 2 - Mission Statement – Hashavas Aveida and Sustaining the World (Parshat Ki Teitzeh 5784)

 

In my opening post, I quoted several frightening statements from Chazal that spell out how enormous is the responsibility of Jewish judges and that many are those who are guilty of “mismanagement” (to be nice). I don’t know if any of these passages are as frightening as the one that we all know from the Mishna at the end of the first chapter of Pirkei Avos: 

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר, על שלשה דברים העולם קיים, על הדין ועל האמת ועל השלום, שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם.

Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The world remains in existence on account of three things – on judgement (Din), on truth (Emess), and on peace (Shalom), as is written (Zecharia 8:16), “truth and judgement and peace must be judged in your cities.”

The implication of this statement is that the application of these three things are vitally essential for sustaining the continued existence of the world. One who upholds these values is sustaining the existence of the world and, conversely, one who is responsible for maintaining these values and shirks his responsibility – and more so if he acts against these values – is destroying the world.  

     

Destroying the world!

As said, these three values keep the world from self-immolation. According to the Mishna they are:

Din – Emess – Shalom

But, according to the verse in Zecharia 8:16 that teaches this to us, they are:

Emess – Mishpat – Shalom

E. M. Sh. = EMeSh.

Introducing Project Emesh. Project Emess, Mishpat and Shalom.

This Mishna in Avos is so fundamental that Rabenu Yaakov ben Asher, the Tur Shulchan Aruch, quotes it to open his section on monetary laws, Choshen Mishpat (1:1). 

The Tur writes a very long introduction, but his main point is that without din - the rule of the judges - along with emess (truth), there cannot be any shalom (peace). Note that the Beis Yosef, ad loc., wants to say that the attribute of din applies to the dayanim, the attribute of emess applies to the witnesses and the attribute of shalom applies to the litigants once they accept the ruling. But the Tur himself places all three things in the domain of the dayanim. If the dayanim do not judge properly, they are ultimately to blame that there is no peace among the litigants.

This even applies if they are called upon to sit in judgement and refrain from doing so. They are not at liberty to walk away. Every Jew is responsible to do what he or she can to prevent another Jew from suffering losses to life, limb or property. This obligation is called השבת אבידה. 

This mitzva happens to be written in this week’s Parsha, Ki Teitzeh (Devarim 22:1 and 22:4). In the mitzva of hashavas aveida (and the following one), the Torah tells us one cannot be present when another Jew’s sheep is wandering or their donkey collapses and ignore them (לא תראה...והתעלמת). If he is present and is in position to assist, he is obligated to do so. We will see the importance of this in future posts.

In my own experiences in monetary Batei Din I have seen way too much shefichas “damim”, in all its ambiguity. This is why it brings cherev to the world (Avos 5:11). There are flaws in the system that cause this that can be easily fixed. 

The mission of Project Emesh is to identify the flaws and to suggest possible remedies. Allow me to repeat what I wrote in my previous post:

This is a project to educate readers about Beis Din. What it is and what it isn’t; how it works and how it should work; what every person should know before they call for a Din Torah or before they respond to one; and how to avoid getting hurt.

Most people, even the most learned among us don’t have a clue.

In short, it is an exercise in hashavas aveida.

One Above and Seven Below was released 17 years ago. As I wrote in the Introduction of the book, its primary purpose is to educate consumers of Judaism as to how it really works. How to get the best results from this “product”. Sadly, those of us who aren’t learned aren’t learned and, as such, they are “consumers” (as opposed to “professionals” or “experts”).

One of the most neglected parts of our religion are the laws of business and monetary issues and resolving disputes. As I wrote in my section about prenups, this applies to family law as well. People blindly get married without really knowing the rights and obligations of each side and what to do if, chas v’shalom, their problems get as far as a Beis Din. When they get to Beis Din, they don’t know what hits them. For this reason, I suggested reforming the Chassan-Kallah education system to include relevant parts of Even HaEzer. 

If a kallah is taught what kinds of behaviors will result in her losing her ketubah in Beis Din, she will know that these behaviors are not only unacceptable, but are hazardous to her bottom line. This should bring about better conduct during a marriage and, when the worst happens, a smoother divorce. But these rules are usually not even taught.

When it comes to Batei Din for mammonos, the problems go way beyond mere ignorance of the players and not knowing the rules, i.e., problems that apply to the litigants. the problems also concern the dayanim of the Batei Din who take advantage of this universal ignorance to bypass the rules. This happens in Batei Din for gittin as well, but there is more hefkeirus (lawlessness) in the monetary courts. 

I will explain why this is so in an upcoming post, but I will divulge one part of the reason. A lot of this has to do with the independence of the various Batei Din. There is absolutely no regulation or oversight for Batei Din, no organization that controls or “unionizes” the Batei Din to work within uniform guidelines. There are no ethics committees and no courts of appeal. There is no Vaad HaKashrut for Batei Din. Not in Israel, for the monetary Batei Din, and not in the diaspora for any Batei Din.

We need these things. Without them, there is no authentic mishpat, no emess and certainly no shalom. This is destroying the world.

And so, the primary mission of Project Emesh, just like the mission of One Above and Seven Below, is to educate the consumerist public about how the system works and how to use it successfully. I consider both to be an exercise in hashavas aveida. 

The secondary objective is to serve or establish some kind of regulatory body which will oversee all affiliated Batei Din. Any Beis Din that won’t be affiliated with this umbrella agency will be considered a outcast. This is similar to the Vaad Mishmeres HaSTaM here in Eretz Yisrael. At some point, I would like to create a database of specific Batei Din and rate their efficiency and compliance.

The ultimate goal is to strengthen emess, mishpat and shalom. Thus, the ultimate goal is to sustain the world!

The upcoming posts will present the realities, the problems and the solutions. They are based on my personal experiences in Beis Din and some as an observer, my association with dayanim and toanim, and my [limited] knowledge of Choshen Mishpat. I know enough to take on this project but there is plenty that I don’t know and would like to.

As such, I encourage any and all readers who have firsthand accounts of the excesses of our Batei Din (i.e., “horror stories”) to share their stories with me. I only want the true objective facts but as much detail as possible. I am more interested in the monetary Batei Din, but stories of any Batei Din are valuable.

As of right now, Project Emesh is nothing more than a concept that resides in my blog site. It is not an official NPO or Amuta, but I hope it will one day be one. It is not [yet] monetized, it has no staff, no web page and no specific email address. It’s all right here. 

I do not yet have a dedicated web site or email address for this project, so for now, all correspondence should be sent to my One Above email address: 1a7b.author@gmail.com. 

I hope this project will take off, make a name for itself and a place for itself (Amuta), and make a constructive difference in Orthodox Jewish society. Who knows? Maybe I’ll even get interviewed on Meaningful People. 

After all, I am trying to strengthen Emess, Mishpat and Shalom with the goal of sustaining the entire world. What could be more meaningful than that?

From Yechezkel's Shabbos Table - Crossing the Desert

In this (past) week's parsha, the Torah forbids us from accepting an Amoni or Moavi as a full fledged convert. And why?

On the surface, the Torah offers us two reasons for this:

על דבר אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים ואשר שכר עליך את בלעם בן בעור מפתור ארם נהרים לקללך

1. For the matter that they did not receive you with bread and water on the road when you exited from Egypt.
2. And as to that he hired Bilaam...to curse you.
   

The commentaries converge en masse to try to make sense out of these two reasons. And, at the very least, the manner they are presented. The great difficulty is not with reason number 2 - that he hired Bilaam to curse you. It seems to be a very sensible reason to turn down their application. But how are we supposed to understand the first reason - they did not greet you with bread and water?

The questions abound, mainly, isn't this a bit overblown? What's the big deal? After all:

1. Does this mean free bread and water (Chizkuni)? No other nation greeted us with free bread and water and we have no problem with them. We all know there is no such thing as a free breakfast!
   
2. If we mean that they were not willing to sell us bread and water, well, the pasuk in Devarim 2:29 explicitly indicates that the Moavim were happy to do so (see Oznayim L'Torah ad loc). Business is business!
   
3. And, why did we need bread and water in the desert anyway, didn't we have the mahn and the spring of Miriam?

And, even if we consider it a valid shortcoming, how does it compare in significance to the second reason? Moreover, why does it deserve to get precedence over the second reason?

Another question: The term the Torah uses for "receive you with bread and water..." is קדמו. Though, difficult to translate into English, the implication of this choice of terminology is to head off, to make the first move, to preempt, to be there before something else...

...to be there before what? What were they supposed to preempt?

I have seen some or all of these questions in the works of various prominent commentaries, but there is one looming question that I have yet to see in print:

The Torah tells us that "they did not receive you with bread and water בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים - on the road as you exited Egypt".

When you exited Egypt? That was 40 years ago! The encounter with Moav and Bilaam and Baal Pe'or occurred at the end of the 40 year period when we were encamped at Arvos Moav. Why does the Torah call this בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים?

Now that we brought it up, it does seem a bit curious, doesn't it? This phrase - בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים - has not yet made an appearance in the entire Torah. And here in this Parsha, Ki Teitzei, it suddenly shows up written identically no less than 3 times!! The first time is here in our pasuk - Devarim 23:5. The second time is in Devarim 24:9 when we are commanded to recall the ordeal of Miriam and her tzoraas. The third time is in 25:17 in the renowned Parshat Zachor when we recall the attack of Amalek.

Three times the identical phrase in this Parsha and nowhere else in the Torah! There must be some common denominator. Yet none of the classical commentaries deal with it. Even the great Baal HaTurim whose mission is to compare identical phrases throughout the Tanach seems to have overlooked this one (we will have to dock him from his pay!)

But, returning to our question, the use of this phrase by Amalek makes perfect sense. They attacked us in Refidim, within a month or two of our Exodus. The ordeal of Miriam occurred in the second year, prior to the incident of the spies. Perhaps, this can also be considered "on our way out of Egypt". But the incident with Moav and Bilaam? This did not occur until after the 40 years, as stated earlier.

The key to solving this problem lies with the commentary of Rabeinu Bechaye. But first, let us study a passage from the gemara in Kiddushin (31b):

Rabi Tarfon had a mother for whom when she wanted to go into her bed he would bend down so she can climb up on him and when she wanted to step off she would step down on him. He expressed an exaltation in the Beis HaMidrash and the Rabbis said to him, "You have not yet reached the midpoint of your obligation. Has it occurred that she threw your money purse into the sea in front of you and you restrained from berating her?"

How are we to understand the obligation of honoring our parents? We can look at it from 2 perspectives:

1- The relationship that we have with our parents mirrors the relationship we have with HKBH. We must honor them in order to simulate the honor that we must have for our Father in Heaven. This is mentioned explicitly in the gemara in Kiddushin 30b.

In this sense, the mitzva is actually a mitzva of Bein Adam L'Makom - between man and G-d. This can explain why this mitzva is to be found on the first of the 2 tablets.

2 - The more pragmatic aspect is that it is Bein Adam L'Chaveiro. We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to our parents. Even if they did not look after us from the time of our birth (which is seldom the case) we still owe our very existence to them for they brought us into the world. For those to whom we owe our very existence, there is no limit to the extent that we must express our gratitude.

This is the message that the Rabbis conveys to Rabi Tarfon. All of your gestures do not even reach the midpoint because, for something without limit, there is no midpoint.

Now, returning to our subject, Rabeinu Bechaye explains that Amon and Moav carry a tremendous debt of gratitude toward the descendents of Avraham. Because it is only in the merit of Avraham Avinu that their ancestor Lot was saved from the destruction of Sodom. The descendents of Ammon and Moav are indebted to Avraham Avinu - and, by extention, to us - for their very existence! And, as such, no gesture of appreciation would be considered too much.
And so, the Torah is telling us in reason number 1 that if Ammon and Moav truly appreciated their obligations to Klal Yisrael, they would have, 40 years previous, the moment they heard that this great nation was released from Egypt, they would have loaded up their camels with bread and water, and crossed over the entire Sinai desert and offered to take care of their needs for bread and water before HKBH took the initative to miraculously supply water and mahn. They should have said, "HKBH, hold off with the miracle bread and spring water. The bread and water is on us."

So the Torah says: על דבר אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים . For the matter that they didn't run across the desert and take the initiative to provide bread and water...

But, you may say, this is a bit of an exagerration. Okay to be friendly and not hostile and to help the Jews when they come knocking at their door, but you don't mean to actually get up and cross the desert and feed them...

So the Torah adds: בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים

Where else do I find this phrase? Oh yes, by Amalek - 25:17 (we will have to shelve the reference by Miriam in 24:9). And what did Amalek do?

That's right, the moment that they heard that this great nation was released from Egypt, they loaded their camels with guns and knives and journeyed out across the entire Sinai desert just to attack us and do us harm. Because they hated us. They hated us so much they just couldn't wait to attack us even if it means transsecting a huge formidable desert.

To attack us. To harm us.

Now, to be fair, this is not without a basis. After all, Yaakov our ancestor did indeed steal the brachos from Eisav, their ancestor. So there does exist some form of "debt of hatred". And the sons of Eisav are very good about making good on their debts. But our relationship with Ammon and Moav should be different. There is no "debt of hatred" to be paid, but rather a debt of gratitude. Something that is normally expressed by chessed and kinship.

So, the Torah asks, if one nation is so motivated to load up their camels with weapons and cross the desert for destruction and evil, and the middah of Tov is 500 times greater than the middah of Rah (Rashi Shmos 20:6), is it too much to ask another nation to load up their camels and to cross the desert for chessed and emes?

And if they would have done so, imagine what they may have been zocheh to!!

So the Torah tells us: על דבר אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים

Okay, so 40 years ago when they had a chance for greatness, which would entail no more effort than the Amaleikim actually invested for their destructive purposes, they passed it up. We can live with that. Not everybody is so motivated. But what happened now when these Jews to whom they owe so much are actually standing at their doorstep?

ואשר שכר עליך את בלעם בן בעור מפתור ארם נהרים לקללך.

Can a nation that is so ungrateful, that is so treacherous ever have a place in Klal Yisrael?

לא תדרוש שלמם וטבתם כל ימיך לעולם.

Fresh for Shabbos: Follow up on Nationality of Ruth

It is time to solve the puzzle about Ruth's nationality. First, let us briefly review the issue:

• Rashi in BaMidbar (22:4) quotes a Midrash Tanchuma that claims that Balak was actually Midyani.
• Talmud Bavli (Sotah 47a, etc.) maintains that Balak was a direct ancestor of Ruth and two places indicate the ancestry to be directly patrilineal.
• In Yevamos 78b and Rambam (Hilchos Issurei Biah 12:21) it is ruled that for non-Jews, nationhood is determined by patrilineal ancestry.
• Therefore, Ruth is actually Midyani and not Moavi.

Q.E.D.

Before we go on, let us discuss what exactly may be the ramifications of this astounding revelation. There are two major ones. The first of which I noted in my initial post:
If Ruth is not actually Moavi, there is no need for a controversy during the time of Boaz and again when Doeg HaAdomi challenged Dovid's legitimacy (TB Yevamos 76b).
Let's call this Axiom A.

There is a second ramification that I consciously omitted:
Chazal explicitly link Dovid's and Ruth's pedigree to Lot (Bava Kamma 38b; Midrash Rabba Breishis 41, 50). If Ruth is actually a Midyani and not Moavi, then there is no true blood line up to Lot.
Let's call this Axiom B.

There is one other issue that I wish to posit:
We chareidim are very respectful of Chazal and take their words very seriously and literally as Chazal themselves do (see Sanhedrin 69b and Ben Ish Chai on Zevachim 113b). We always consider the words of Chazal to be accepted as factual – especially when they do not involve supernatural aspects – unless we are forced to view them otherwise.
Let's call this Axiom C.

As a supplement to Axiom C, we very much prefer not to have to modify or update the words of Chazal with details that are not explicitly implied in the text.
Let us call this Axiom D.

With this in mind, we can examine possible approaches to this issue and their impact on our list of axioms. There are a number of possible approaches. However – each one comes at a price.

To my dismay, only one reader cared to suggest approaches to this issue. A studious fellow who identified himself as Josh Waxman which I will assume to be his true name. Reb Josh suggested 2 approaches and then commented that I may have better ones. To R' Josh I say: I wish I did.

His first suggestion was that the Midrash Tanchuma and Talmud Bavli are two unrelated perspectives that are not meant to harmonize.

In other words, the Talmud Bavli that says that Ruth descended from Balak does not mention anywhere that Balak is a prince of Midyan. As such, TB can hold that Balak was a pure blooded Moavi and we have no issue. Likewise, the Midrash Tanchuma that says that Balak was a Midyanite does not suggest that he was an ancestor of Ruth or of Eglon. Eglon, not being Balak's descendant, would have been a true blooded Moavi. So each one can stand on its own podium but cannot harmonize with the other.

With this approach, Axioms A, B, and D are not impaired but Axiom C - the literal veracity of Chazal - is severely compromised since we cannot view both of the maamarei Chazal to be factual.

I believe that this is the most logical approach and it is the one that I personally support. To sacrifice Axiom C is a bitter pill to swallow but we are forced to go this route on other occasions as well. There are numerous cases of conflicting Midrashim even in Talmud Bavli itself such as the gemara in Sanhedrin 106b that suggests that Bilaam HaRasha, who died in the year 2488, never reached the age of 35. This would be in clear contradiction of the Chazal that he was one of Pharaoh's advisers before Moshe's birth 120 years earlier – as pointed out in Rashi (Sanhedrin 106b s.v. Bar Tlasin) – and also of the Chazal in Zevachim (116a) that says that Bilaam was a world leader at the time of Mattan Torah in 2448.

At this point I will say that I am much taken aback that I have found almost no authorities who deal with this question at all. In all my searches, I have found two unlikely heroes. Neither of them is prepared to go with Reb Josh's first approach and to sacrifice Axiom C.

The first of these two heroes is the Mahari"t on Masechet Kiddushin (67a) which I found quoted in a sefer entitled Mishbitzos Zahav on Megillat Ruth by Rav Shabsi Weiss (hat tip: Rabbi Dovid Solomon). The Mahari"t that he quotes poses the question exactly as I wrote it in my original post and answers the question exactly as Reb Josh Waxman writes in his second approach. This is that the decree of "Lo yavo Amoni…" applied no less to Balak himself regardless of his blood nationality, and so, the controversy was legitimate even if, technically, Ruth was a Midyanite.

This approach sustains Axioms A, C, and D but it does not repair the damage to Axiom B. Of course, we can artificially sustain Axiom B if we accept this approach and add to it that since the wives of Balak's descendants were most likely true Moavites, there is a blood line up to Lot even if not patrilineal. It is very "b'diavad" and is like saying that at least 50% of Kohanim can actually be called Midyanim since at least half of Kohanim descend from Elazar and his wife was a Midyanite. (Likewise all of humanity is descended from Kayin because Noach's wife was Kayin's descendant – Rashi Breishis 4:22 s.v. Naama).

The second authority that I found is the Piskei Tosafos at the back of Masechet Sotah (in the produce department). He addresses the passage in Sotah 47a that discusses Ruth's lineage. Curiously enough, there are no Tosafot on Sotah 47a nor in all of Perek Egla Arufa. In item 56, he states as follows:

Balak was from the princes of Midyan and his daughter married a Moavi. Ruth was a daughter's daughter to Eglon. As a reward for his rising from his throne, Ruth descended from him.

Thus, Piskei Tosafos solves the problem by modifying the context of Talmud Bavli to acknowledge that Balak was Midyani and that he begat Ruth BUT he posits that it was not pure patrilineal descent. Ruth did not emanate from his son but rather his daughter whose husband was Moavi.

Two things are clear from Piskei Tosafos: (1) He was definitely bothered by the problem – one of the very few and (2) he went to great lengths to avoid violating Axiom C. His approach will sustain Axioms A, B, and C very nicely but the price to pay is to modify the text of the Talmud from its literal context and thus to violate Axiom D. Perhaps, that is the smallest price to pay.

So, to sum up, we have discussed three approaches to our problem. Two are to be found in respected sources and these are the only written sources that I have found to date. What I intrigues me is that neither of these commentaries want to take the easy route (Approach #1) at the expense of Axiom C. To my knowledge, none of the great classical commentaries address this problem. This can mean one of two things:

• They did not notice it – (hard to believe - well, I did).
• They do not consider it an issue because they will accept Approach #1 and do not care to go to great pains to sustain the integrity of Axiom C - Axiom C is expendable.

Axiom C refers to the extent that we can rely on Chazal's explanations as being factual. This is one of the greatest debates of today.

Tishbi Yitaretz Kushyos U'sfekos