Author’s note –
This post speaks candidly about some very mature topics. It is still a kosher l’mehadrin
post. Nevertheless, I needed to purposely misspell some words so the post will
not be blocked by content filters.
After all the book reports that I presented in my last
post, I would like to present just one more.
This is on a book titled: One Above and Seven Below
by Yechezkel Hirshman and it is truly one of my favorites. I have read it cover
to cover numerous times and I highly recommend it.
One Above and Seven Below has
a subtitle: A Consumer’s Guide to Orthodox Judaism from the Perspective of
the Chareidim. In the Intro chapter, the author explains the subtitle and
bemoans the fact that many mitzvah observant Jews are simply consumers to
Judaism. This means they really don’t know much about it.
He goes on to list a number of hazards that a consumer of
Judaism is prone to (page 32). Hazard #3 is as follows:
·
Hazard #3 - Vulnerability for
allowing concepts (read: propaganda) from non-religious sources to influence
one’s position on religious issues.
What he means is that consumerist Jews who live in
Western societies tend to develop their philosophies based on non-Jewish
Western secular values. To be more blunt, this is saying that many American
mitzvah observant Jews think more like a secular American than they think like
a Jew.
The best example is that Westernized Jewish women tend be
influenced by today’s more egalitarian philosophies when it comes to marriage
roles and inheritance. Because the secular laws call for no-fault divorce and equitable
distribution, this is what she expects. Then she files for no-fault divorce in a
secular court or she gets a yerusha that is contested. When the case reaches
a beis din she is shocked to discover that there is no such thing as no-fault
divorce in Shulchan Aruch and inheritance rules are not as equitable as she
thought.
All this time she was thinking like an American woman but
she wasn’t thinking like a Jew. This is a consumer.
The author uses the term “hazard” because these
consumerist shortcomings are not merely handicaps but they are truly dangerous.
They can lead to a lot of needless damage in the form of monetary damage,
injury, and death. I hope to elaborate more in the next post.
The purpose of this post is to present מראה מקומות – source material – for the upcoming post.
It is meant to describe how the Torah, Talmud, and Halacha define legal
concepts. In some cases the Halachic definition is very close to the Western
one, which certainly adds to the confusion. Minor discrepancies can make big
differences.
Thus, as a public service and as a (second) preamble to
the coming post, I am honored to present a “glossary” of both legal terms and
Halachic terms and to present the Western and/or Halachic meanings and sources
where applicable.
Let’s begin.
Seksual Act (Giluy Arayos)
In the Western world this generally means an activity
between any two (or more) creatures under the sun (or under the covers) where
any part of one creature’s body comes into contact with any part of another
creature’s body – usually in an intimate manner.
In the Torah world it is limited to an activity where the
reproductive organ of a male mammal comes into contact with an orifice of
another mammal (male or female) below the waste. At least one of the mammals
must be a human being. If the act does not involve the reproductive organ of a
male mammal, it is not a seksual act in the eyes of the Torah.
Lezbian Activity
Lezbian activity is not a form of giluy arayos since it
does not involve a male mammal. It is not subject to any of the extreme
penalties of giluy arayos. Nevertheless, according to Rambam (Issurei Biah
21:8), this is forbidden under the category of Maaseh Eretz Mitrzrayim
and those who engage in it are subject to Makkos Mardus. Still, he says clearly
that there is no explicit prohibition for this in the Torah. Likewise, a
lezbian act does not make a woman unfit to marry a kohein.
Pedophile
From
a lot of news items that I have read, there seems to be a lot of confusion as
to what this means. Let’s go with an official definition (From Wikipedia):
Pedophilia or paedophilia is a psychiatric disorder in which an adult or older adolescent experiences a
primary or exclusive seksual attraction to prepubescent children. Although girls typically
begin the process of puberty at age 10 or 11, and boys at age 11 or 12, criteria for pedophilia extend the
cut-off point for prepubescence to age 13.
This
tells us that a pedophile is one who lusts after children using the biological
definition (which just happens to be the Halachic definition, as well).
Amazingly, one who lusts after young women who have already attained puberty
such as 14 or 15 years old and beyond, who has all the bells and whistles, is
not a pedophile. Make a note of this.
Homophile – Gay or Lezbian
Homophilia
(homoseksuality or Same Sex Attraction – SSA) is
a psychiatric disorder in which
an individual experiences a primary or exclusive seksual attraction to a member of the same gender. Very often homophiles
like to dress and act in ways that resemble the norms of the opposite gender.
In a clinical sense, one can be homoseksual even without doing a homoseksual
act.
If
a person is by preference heteroseksual but, due to supply and demand, only has
access to members of the same gender – such as those cooped up in segregated
schools, the military, or prison – and they take advantage of a member of their
gender as a substitute, and they do not adopt the mannerisms of the opposite
gender, they are not clinically homoseksual. Hence, one can do a homoseksual
act even if one is not homoseksual. This is especially true regarding lezbian
activity since, halachically, it is not even a seksual act. Thus, in many
cases, a woman who engages in lezbian activity is not truly a lezbian. Make a
note of this, too.
Child
There are three definitions of a child – Halachic,
biological, and Western legal.
Halachic definition of a child – A person who has not yet
reached puberty
Biological definition of a child – A person who has not
yet reached puberty
Western legal definition of a child – A person who is not
considered old enough to know that he is not a child. This is better known as
the “age of consent”. This depends on what somebody needs to consent to and
varies from state to state. In “red” states it’s younger and in “blue” states
it is older.
Age of Consent
For all judicial matters, the Halachic age of consent is
the same as the transition from childhood to puberty. This would be the age of
13 for a male and the age of 12 for a female. For Western standards, see above.
Rape - Oness
The original Western legal definition of rape is the
insertion of an object or body part into the orifice of another person without
their consent. More recently, the legal term “rape” has been replaced by a more
vague term “seksual assault” or “deviant seksual assault”. Nowadays, since the
Western concept of “sex” has been expanded to mean any type of intimate
contact, it has evolved that any type of unwanted intimate contact is now
called “rape”.
In Halacha, rape is a [genuine] seksual act committed by a male
toward a female or another male without the latter’s consent. A female cannot
rape anybody.
Another very important distinction is that when I just wrote that the Western definition is "insertion...without their consent", I meant just that. It is enough for an act to be without consent even if not by physical coercion to be called rape. The Torah's standard of "without consent" really means by force, either brute physical force or the threat of physical force. Absence of force or the threat of force is construed as consent. I discuss this more in the next section on Pitui.
Another very important distinction is that when I just wrote that the Western definition is "insertion...without their consent", I meant just that. It is enough for an act to be without consent even if not by physical coercion to be called rape. The Torah's standard of "without consent" really means by force, either brute physical force or the threat of physical force. Absence of force or the threat of force is construed as consent. I discuss this more in the next section on Pitui.
Interestingly, the Halacha is only concerned about the
seksual aspect of rape in regard to the penalties of giluy arayos and
eligibility to marry a kohein. In terms of the “violence” of rape, it is looked
upon exactly the same as any non-seksual physical assault. Just as one needs to
compensate another for personal injury - pain, medical expenses, loss of
employment, disgrace - so the rapist must compensate monetarily. Personal injury
is a financial matter, not a criminal one. Halachically, there is no call for
corporal punishment or incarceration or other extreme punishment for rape.
Thus, surprisingly, rape that is not incestuous,
homoseksual, or adulterous is not a Halachic felony at all. It is merely a
monetary tort. (Ironically, if it is a Halachic felony and there is a judicial penalty for giluy arayos, this may supersede the civil requirement for compensation and the victim gets nothing!)
The only outstanding issue is if one deflowers a young
single woman (up to 12 ½ years) without her consent, he is subject to a special
fine payable to her father for taking her virginity and, if the young woman so
chooses, life imprisonment as her husband.
Statutory rape (Pitui)
Statutory rape (or “Indecent liberties with a minor/child” or “Carnal
knowledge of a minor/child”) is a situation of a male carrying out a seksual act with
a female between the ages of puberty and the legal age of consent even if she
professed her consent. For this, we usually fall back to traditional
definitions of “sex”. If it is not a full seksual act it is usually only called
“molestation”.
Interestingly enough, this offense may actually be
modeled after the Halachic precedent of pitui (Shmos 22:15). Pitui is the same case as
related above of deflowering a young woman up to 12 ½ years, but it was with
her consent. In this case, the male can avoid the fine if both parties agree to
marriage. If either side does not want a marriage, the male must pay the fine
to the father.
We see from here that according to Halacha, a girl who
has reached puberty is fully capable of consent. Thus, from the viewpoint of Halacha, we
consider any girl above the age of 12 to know what she is doing. The Rambam (Hilchos
Naara Besula 1:2) says that the burden of proof to claim that the event was
non-consensual is upon the 12 year old girl unless it took place in a secluded
area where nobody could hear if she would scream.
More than this, in case the girl was betrothed or
married, even at this age she is liable for the death penalty if she is seduced
by a man but not forced by pain of death (or fear of death).
Nashim Daatan Kalos (Kedushin 80b)
This is a Talmudic dictum which tells us that women are
vulnerable to seduction at any age.
The ramification of this combined with what I wrote in
the previous topic is that Halachically, a 25 year old woman cannot complain of
being taken advantage of at the age of 15 by professing “I was young and vulnerable”
because she is just as vulnerable at 25 as she is at 15 and she is just as
responsible at 15 as she is when 25.
Victim
Halachically, a victim is somebody who suffered a loss,
injury, trauma, or whatever, at the hands of another person and who did nothing
of substance to contribute to the event. If they
contributed to any degree, it is questionable if they can be considered a
victim. (Rashi Devarim 22:23)
I wrote about this at great length in this post.
Secondary or Expanded Liability
The Western world believes in Secondary or
Expanded liability. The Torah world does not. Secondary liability means holding
a person responsible for an offense he did not commit solely because he is
somehow associated with the real offender.
Here is what I wrote in my post about the Markey bill dated May 5, 2009:
We are all influenced by
western society's dogma of "all associated parties are responsible"
that is the basis of mountains of litigation in Western courtrooms. Negligence
here, negligence there. Everybody is responsible for the miscreant behavior of
their children and spouses and their children's spouses and their spouse's
children and their employees and their employee's spouses and children and for
their products and for what their products produce and for everybody who can't
read instructions and doesn't know that coffee is hot. In the West there is
never an ingrown toenail without somebody to sue.
Is that what the Halacha says?
Here's what the gemara says (Baba kamma 87a): חרש שוטה וקטן פגיעתן רעה החובל בהן חייב והם שחבלו באחרים פטורין. העבד והאשה פגיעתן רעה החובל בהם חייב והם שחבלו באחרים פטורין
This means that from an Halachic perspective, when an person inflicts some damage, it doesn't matter who their spouse is, who their parent is, who their employer is, as long as the parent/spouse/employer did not actively aid and abet the perpetrator, and more so if they were not aware of their destructive tendencies, then there are no Halachic grounds for compensation from them.
Is that what the Halacha says?
Here's what the gemara says (Baba kamma 87a): חרש שוטה וקטן פגיעתן רעה החובל בהן חייב והם שחבלו באחרים פטורין. העבד והאשה פגיעתן רעה החובל בהם חייב והם שחבלו באחרים פטורין
This means that from an Halachic perspective, when an person inflicts some damage, it doesn't matter who their spouse is, who their parent is, who their employer is, as long as the parent/spouse/employer did not actively aid and abet the perpetrator, and more so if they were not aware of their destructive tendencies, then there are no Halachic grounds for compensation from them.
Neemanus (Devarim 19:15)
Substantiating facts by the word of somebody who is
qualified to establish facts. Halchically, this means an adult male eye witness
who is fully objective. To have complete neemanus this testimony must be
corroborated by a second such eye witness.
Nogeah B’Edus (Sanhedrin 23b and 34a)
Having a stake in the case. This means that one cannot be
objective and has no level of neemanus.
Adam Karov Eitzel Atzmo (Sanhedrin 10a)
Talmudic terminology to indicate that no person is
objective enough to testify on his own behalf. This especially applies to
alleged victims of wrongdoing.
Raglayim L’davar (Sota 3a)
A cheap substitute for neemanus that beis din can rely
upon in a situation where an issue cannot be ignored but genuine neemanus is
unavailable.
Raglayim l’davar means there are credible known facts or
axiomatic circumstances that give a claim “legs” (raglayim) of support. One
example is mesiach lefi tumo – if an objective person makes a casual
statement without being aware of the ramifications of such statement. Another
example is when a man violates hilchos yichud with a woman and the woman claims
there was seksual activity. There is a raglayim l’davar that there was indeed
such activity but no neemanus for her to claim that it was not consensual
because adam karov eitzel atzmo.
Note – Raglayim l’davar is
usually only adequate for protective measures such as to invoke a restraining
order (tzav meniya) but not for punitive measures. For this we would need
neemanus.
Umdenah D’Muchach (Baba Basra 146b – Shu”A Ch”M
61:9)
Irrefutable circumstantial evidence. Such as a smoking
gun with a ballistics match or a DNA match in a seksual assault case. Another
basis for a raglayim l’davar.
Dan L’Kaf Zechus (B’Tzedek Tishpot – Vayikra 19:16)
In Pirkei Avos and other places in Shas we are advised to
judge people favorably. We can mistakenly look at this to be just a commendable
personality trait but not an actual obligation. The Chofetz Chaim doesn’t see it this
way. He maintains (Hilchos Lashon Hara 3:7) that in any situation where we see,
hear or read about a misdeed, if there is any room to be dan the event l’kaf zchus,
we are obligated to do so. He repeats this incessantly throughout
his writings. According to him, this is not optional.
At the judicial level, both the Halachic system and the
Western system promote presumption of innocence. The burden of proof is
always upon the plaintiff.
Malshinus (Vayikra 19:16)
The act of disclosing the wrongdoings of one person to
another. Alternatively, the act of disclosing the whereabouts of a person or property of
a person who is being sought after as a wrongdoer.
Mesira (Shu”A Ch’M 388)
The act of malshinus directed to an entity that does not employ
Torah sanctioned methods of dealing with the alleged wrongdoing. This usually
includes any non-Jewish entity and quite a few Jewish ones.
Rodef (Sanhedrin 73a)
One who poses a clear and present danger to another. If
it is unclear whether he poses a present danger (safek rodef) it may also be
justified to apply the rules of rodef if there is a raglayim l’davar (but
proceed with caution). However, if one clearly does not pose any danger
at all at present, he is not a rodef and not subject to the rules. This
should be crystal clear.
Nezek - Financial Damage (Shu”A
Ch”M 378:1)
An action that directly causes a monetary depreciation.
In a typical case where a grown person inflicts such damage, he will be liable
for full compensation in beis din.
Gram Nezek – Inadvertant Damage (Bava Kamma 55b)
A roundabout action that indirectly causes a monetary depreciation
to another. Such as opening the door to somebody’s barn and allowing the horses
to flee and be lost. The perpetrator did not do any direct harm to the horses
so he cannot be considered a true mazik. In this case beis din cannot make him
liable but he is considered to be fully liable in the Heavenly court.
There are varying degrees of Gram Nezek. The simple case
is like the above example where the mazik was simply negligent and his wayward
action did not inevitably have to result in a damage. It just came out that
way. Here, he will still be liable in a Heavenly court. There are more extreme
cases where the mazik intended for the result and/or the
resulting damage were an inevitable cause and effect. For example if Reuven
takes an object from Shimon and intentionally lays it on a railroad track just
in time for the 4:38 Express. This is called Garmi and is obviously more
serious. According to Rabi Meir (Baba Kamma 100a), this damage can be ruled for
liability in a standard beis din. Even though we do not generally pasken like
Rabi Meir, today, many batei din use their judicial license to obligate the
perpetrator to pay in cases like this.
The lesson is that just because a beis din cannot prosecute
such a case does not mean that the perpetrator is not a mazik and there is no
penalty. There is a Heavenly penalty which, likely as not, may be more severe.
We will demonstrate that the concept of chayav bidei shamayim
– liable in a Heavenly court – applies to a whole slew of infractions between
man and man.
Chavala – Personal Injury (Baba Kamma 83b)
An action that causes personal injury to another. This is
a form of nezek as described above but it is expanded that it includes
liability for collateral losses such as pain and embarrassment, medical
expenses, and lost wages due to disability.
Since this goes into the category of monetary damage, the
same rules of Gram and Garmi automatically apply. Actually, the gemara (Baba
Kamma 56a) even presents a case of one who suddenly frightens his friend and,
as such, indirectly causes an injury. This is likewise liable in the heavenly
court.
Retzicha – Murder (Breishis 9:6)
An action that directly causes the death of another. This
is a capital crime subject to the death penalty.
Here, as well, the death penalty in a beis din can only
be carried out if the act of murder was direct and immediate. (Besides all the
other stipulations of two witnesses and being forewarned, etc.) But what about
somebody who is merely a “Gram” rotzeach such as one who hires killers or one
who sics a wild animal on his victim? The gemara tells us that he is exempt so
the unassuming scholar may conclude that this is OK. This is not murder. Let’s
do it.
For this reason, the Rambam (Rotzeach 2:2) goes to
great lengths to tell us that one who murders through hire or agency or
indirect methods is “a spiller of blood and carries the sin of murder and is
liable [for death] in a heavenly court.” In the next Halacha he presents the
scriptural sources for this claim. In the next Halacha he states that “for all
these types of murderers who are not liable in beis din” the king is allowed to
impose the death penalty on his own, and even Beis din can make a special
deterent case and execute him. Finally, in the next Halacha he states that even
if beis din is unable to impose a judicial execution, they should "beat them
within inches of their lives, imprison them for long periods under harsh
conditions, and to find other means of distressing them" to deter others.
Gonev Nefashos (Gonev ish u’mecharo) - Kidnapping
and False Imprisonment (Shmos 21:16 - Devarim 24:7)
The Western definition of kidnapping is: Transporting a
person against his will. In Halacha this
is called Gonev Nefashos and is the prime intent of the prohibition of Lo
Tignov in the Ten Commandments. This is also a capital crime.
Technically speaking, for one to be liable for death in a
standard beis din, there must be three infractions: (1) Kidnapping – transporting
the person from his home and (2) making use of his labor even for a value
less than a peruta and (3) selling him into bondage. One action or two without
the last is not sufficient to incur the death penalty – in a standard court. But
we have learned from Nezek and Rotzeach that the Heavenly court also convenes.
Even though for this transgression it does not say anything explicitly in
Rambam about indirect involvement, there is absolutely no reason to say that
this is any different. Does it need to be spelled out in every kind of sin?
Thus, it is reasonable to say that one who hires others
to kidnap a Jew and sell him into bondage is liable in a Heavenly court.
Likewise, one who kidnaps a Jew and does not profit from him, though he won’t be
liable for death in a standard beis din, he is definitely a miscreant and is
liable to whatever Heaven feels is coming to him.
The question is: Is turning another Jew over for
incarceration at the hands of non-Jews also like “selling” him? Is the sinful
aspect of selling only when there is profit or is it transferring him to
another hostile party even without profit? Is an intangible “gain” from turning
him over (i.e., revenge or personal satisfaction) considered having profited?
These details are not expressed in Halacha but my
personal feeling is that anybody who willfully collaborates with any entity to transport
a Jew from his home and incarcerate him where this action is in no way
warranted by any Halachic premise, is worthy of death at the hands of Heaven.
Lo Tasgir Eved – Extradition (Devarim 23:16)
At face value, this pasuk is telling us not to return a
runaway slave to his non-Jewish owner. But the gemara in Gittin 45a takes this
beyond face value.
There are numerous statements in Shas which tell us how
important it is for a Jew to live in Eretz Yisroel. The most famous are: אסור לצאת מארץ ישראל לחוץ לארץ אלא ללמוד
תורה ולישא אישה (Avoda Zara 13a, Rambam
Melachim 5:9) and הכל מעלים לארץ ישראל ואין הכל מורידין (Kesubos 110b). The gemara in Gittin tells
us how far this goes (also see Shu"A Y"D 267:81-85). It tells us that even a Canaani slave that rightfully
belongs to an observant Jew who lives in chutz l’aretz, if he runs to Eretz
Yisroel it is forbidden to return him to his rightful Jewish owner. He must be
freed and allowed to stay and reimburse his owner.
We cannot extradite a Canaani slave to Chutz l’aretz.
Now, the only pasuk that we have on this issue is this
one about a Canaani slave. What about a Jewish slave (eved ivri)?
Well, we have a rule in the Talmud (Baba Kamma 74a): B’chlal
maatayim mana – 100 is included in 200. If the Torah tells us that even a slave
who is only partially Jewish cannot be extradited to chutz L’aretz, it is
certain that a slave that is fully Jewish cannot be extradited to chutz l’aretz.
And how much more so, it goes without saying that a freeman (ben chorin) who is
Jewish cannot be forcibly extradited outside of Eretz Yisroel for any unholy
reason. See Choshen Mishpat 420:1 for a parallel "kal v'chomer".
Besides all this, it escapes me (pardon the pun) how any ben chorin can be forcibly extradited outside of Eretz Yisroel without transgressing Gonev Ish U’Mecharo (kidnapping) which is a capital crime.
Besides all this, it escapes me (pardon the pun) how any ben chorin can be forcibly extradited outside of Eretz Yisroel without transgressing Gonev Ish U’Mecharo (kidnapping) which is a capital crime.
The upshot is that to extradite a Jew from Eretz Yisroel
to chutz l’aretz is not something I would like on my record. But what about
instigating others to extradite somebody to Chutz l’aretz? Or orchestrating it
indirectly?
We have learned that for Nizkei mammon and Chovel and Retzicha
that indirect involvement (gramma) is liable in a Heavenly court. We have no
reason to think that Gonev Nefashos or Lo Tasgir is any different.
Second Degree Mesira
Second Degree Mesira
After we know all this, we learn something more about
Mesira. We see that there are different degrees
of Mesira. The standard Mesira that the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388)
and Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 3:12) rant about that is the worst infraction imaginable
and the transgressor forfeits his share of Olam Haba is only a simple low-level
moser. This is one who merely discloses to the authorities the wrongdoing or
the whereabouts of the subject. Thereupon, the authorities take matters into
their own hands. Automatic transmission.
However, there is also a more sophisticated heavy-duty
moser. This is one who, in addition to informing on the subject, aids and abets
the prosecution by pressing charges, testifying, supplying evidence, petitioning
the authorities for extradition or an indictment, etc. Manual transmission. For such a person, losing his share in Olam
Haba is getting off way too easy.
The final topic that I need to define is:
אף על פי
שחטא, ישראל הוא
This concept goes together with: The soul of a human
lusts for illicit wealth – gezel - and forbidden relations – arayos (Makkos
23b) and Most people stumble in gezel and some people stumble in arayos and
all people stumble in [avak] lashon hara (Baba Basra 165a).
How many times have we been sitting at a Shabbos table or
at a simcha discussing the latest scandal (avak lashon hara) and somebody
mutters: “How can frum people do such a thing?” Whereupon some self-righteous
person always exclaims: “I’ll tell you how, they are simply not frum!”
This is very wrong. People have lusts which they cannot
always control and the gemara tells us that these two infractions, gezel and
arayos, stand out at the top of the list. Yet, even if one stumbles in some of
the 365 lo taasehs, this does not mitigate his Jewishness one iota. Anybody who
believes in the 13 Ikarei Emunah and keeps Shabbos, wears tallis and tefillin
and keeps all of the positive mitzvos is as “frum” as anybody else. He (or she)
must obviously deal with their demons and make restitution to the people they
hurt or be segragted from the community but it cannot be said that their
service to HKBH in unrelated areas is at all defective. There are "frum" ganavim
and "frum" molesters and their infractions do not inhibit their rights and
responsibilities to daven and learn and keep Shabbos and Yom tov and kosher, etc.
(Note – I once had it out with a Rav after his
shul sent a letter to a member who had been suspected of past abuse. The letter
said that he can only daven there if this and that and he stays in his seat and…he
is not entitled to get any kibudim or aliyos. I asked this Rav, “What are you
going to do when he has yahrtzeit?” And this Rav just looked at me with a
puzzled look on his face as if to say “It didn’t occur to me that he still has
to be Jewish.”)
Thus, if a community must take measures to deal with a
confirmed miscreant and certainly with one who is only suspected, there is no
justification whatsoever to employ a method that will inhibit him from
continuing to keep Torah and mitzvos faithfully as long as it can be avoided. I
can assure you that anybody who participates in an action that impedes another
Jew from continuing his (or her) observance of Torah and mitzvos will have to
answer for it under a very, very hot lamp.
I certainly hope that I have clarified the Torah outlook
on these topics and perhaps, more Jewish consumers can learn how to think like
a Jew. If so, we are now ready to tackle current events.
To be continued…
1 comment:
Gemorah in sotah "harbeh yaldus ossah" contradicts your fardreyed shtickle assuming that there are are no degrees in 'daas kallah' with respect to women's increasing maturity.
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