Author's note - This is Part 2 of a multi-part series. Please see Part 1 and the Author's note in the heading.
Hello, readers, I am back with Part 2. I apologize for the long delay.
One cause of the delay is the fact that this topic calls for a ton of research. I spent hours scouring the poskim for this post. A second cause is the fact that I had recurring dilemmas as to how to present a critique on highly technical Halachic issues in a way that can be followed by readers who are not Halachic techies. I had to scrap several earlier drafts of this post. This post is for Halachic savvy readers.
Hello, readers, I am back with Part 2. I apologize for the long delay.
One cause of the delay is the fact that this topic calls for a ton of research. I spent hours scouring the poskim for this post. A second cause is the fact that I had recurring dilemmas as to how to present a critique on highly technical Halachic issues in a way that can be followed by readers who are not Halachic techies. I had to scrap several earlier drafts of this post. This post is for Halachic savvy readers.
In some of the elaborate Halachic series’ such as the
Kol Koreh (Mesira) series and the Malka Leifer series, it was necessary to prelude
the main posts by dedicating a special post to list and define Talmudic terms
and sources. Logic dictates that I should do the same here. Feedback dictates
that it is probably a fruitless undertaking so I will try to get by without it.
So let’s move on to Part 2.
As of now, two people were brave enough to post
comments to Part 1. Both of whom made a point of reminding me that there is a Hebrew
version of the main body of the PNA that is endorsed by a number of very
prominent poskim that include Harav Hagaon Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, Shlita
and Maran Harav Ovadia Yosef, ZT”L.
In response, I must quote one of those commenters, “You
are missing my point.”
I am not trying to assert that the PNA is invalid as
automatically engendering a get meuseh. Who am I to say so? Besides, if I
wanted to, I can point to a substantial group of prominent poskim who are quite
non-supportive of this agreement to say the least. It wouldn’t have to come
from me.
What I am trying to assert is that even if the PNA is
Halachically valid, there are issues that compromise its enforceability and, by
extension, its effectiveness.
I am not the only one who noticed an enforceability
issue here; Rabbi Willig saw it, too. But I think it is being swept under the
rug and is much more serious than it is being made out to be.
So, to respond to the commenters, let’s refer to the
Hebrew version of the PNA. And let’s refer to the English one (Standard Version). One may notice a slight variation. Did these commenters who laud the text of
HRHGZN”G notice this subtle yet crucially important difference?
And what is this variation?
In the current English version there is an odd clause added in. It says: “and I recite that I shall be deemed to have repeated this waiver
at the time of our wedding.” These words are not in the original
Hebrew, so why are do they appear in the current English?
Says Rabbi Willig (70:45) that, without these words,
the waiver part of the agreement will not be enforceable. He points to the
gemara in Kesubos (83a) that tells us that one cannot relinquish any “rights” prior
to the wedding because he hasn’t been awarded them yet. The opportune time for
such a thing would be after the kiddushin but before the nissuin. So by
repeating this waiver after the kiddushin, or being deemed to have done so, we
have grand-slammed the ball on to Waive-land (Ave. – sorry, Cubs fans, wait
till next year century).
So says Rabbi Willig, Shlita. With a poker face, I am
seeing Rabbi Willig’s bet and I am raising him. He acknowledges that without
adding these additional words, the waiver aspect will not be enforceable. I am
betting that even after adding these words, it is not
enforceable.
What gives (or takes)?
In this clause, the husband agrees to “waive his rights
to his wife’s earnings…” What rights are these?
In Part 1, I asserted that we need to differentiate
between “dividend” earnings that come as a result of revenues of property holdings
(Peiros), and “job” earnings that come as a result of profits and wages (Maaseh
Yedayim). I explained why the waiver cannot apply to the Peiros. The Peiros
benefit is a result of obtaining joint title in the property. Once this title
is acquired by the husband, the only way to “waive” it is to transfer his share
of the title back to his wife. This
requires a fresh kinyan at the time of relinquishing which cannot be done in
advance (see Chelkas Mech. Even HaEzer 92:8 SK 17). Hence, even after the PNA is signed, and even if his obligation to
increase the support takes effect at the time of the signing (not a sure thing),
the husband can still retract the waiver on this income as long as it (the
waiver) hasn’t taken effect – which is not until the separation.
We now turn our attention to the Maaseh Yedayim
(earnings). Here we will need to get very technical.
When the husband waives his rights to his wife’s earnings what is he doing?
When the husband waives his rights to his wife’s earnings what is he doing?
Well, let’s pretend we live in Monopoly-land and that
it is a Halachic state (like Palmtree, NY). There is a wonderful law in
Monopoly-land that every citizen who passes Go is entitled to collect $200. Yippie!
Let’s assume that the law also says that if one passes Go and neglects to collect his $200, he can no longer claim those $200 – but this applies only after he passes Go, not before (see Rema in Ch”M 209:4).
Let’s assume that the law also says that if one passes Go and neglects to collect his $200, he can no longer claim those $200 – but this applies only after he passes Go, not before (see Rema in Ch”M 209:4).
Now let’s say, R. Doniel Trumpsky, a big-shot loaded
gvir, is running for mayor and wants to show off his benevolence so he declares
that he is “waiving his rights” to the $200. He still passes Go like everyone
else and he is still entitled to the $200. He is merely abstaining from
collecting the money (or cashing the check).
We would say that he is being mochel (pardoning) the
$200 back to the community chest. In this context “waiving his rights” means
that he is choosing not to exercise his right to collect the $200. So now he
won’t have these $200 in his pocket, but nothing happens to his basic right to
collect it. The “right” is still there.
This is the standard. When someone “waives” a right, it
doesn’t technically mean that he gives up the right. In most cases a person
cannot give up a right. The right comes from the constitution of the domain
(Church or State) that governs one’s life. The 5th amendment to the
US Constitution gives us the right to remain silent. One can “waive” his 5th
amendment rights in any given instance. But it only means that in this
instance he is not exercising his right. The right is still there for
him to use whenever he doesn’t want to waive it. He doesn’t lose the right and
cannot, even if he wanted to.
The Monopoly-land constitution was written by the
founding fathers – the Parker Brothers. If you pass Go you can collect $200.
That’s the law of the land. R. Doniel Trumpsky – wealthy as he is – cannot
change the law. He cannot get rid of the right. But since the right is a
benefit, he cannot be forced to accept the benefit. So he can waive the benefit
of the right; but not the right itself.
So, now, let’s say after blowing his life’s savings on
his campaign, R. Doniel loses the mayoral race to R. Hillel Clintowitz. He
changes his mind about not collecting his $200. Well, it’s his constitutional
right, always was and always remains. So he can now begin again to collect the
$200 though he may not be able to reclaim the payments that he waived earlier.
So when he declared he is “waiving” his right, what he
is saying is that, until further notice, whenever he passes Go he will not exercise
his right to collect the money. In effect, the declaration means nothing
because he can still collect the money next time he passes Go. Either he will
live up to his declaration or not but his right to collect the money doesn’t go
away. He can also change his mind even after his declaration if he still hasn’t
passed Go.
This is the typical scenario and in a Halachic
framework it is called mechila (pardoning or excusing).
Is there any way he can shake off his “rights” once and
for all?
There may be. As a citizen of Monopoly-land he is
entitled to the rights whether he wants them or not. But perhaps, if it’s not a
communist dictatorship, he can renounce his citizenship in
Monopoly-land. He doesn’t change any laws or rights, he just removes himself
from eligibility. Likewise, suppose he is not a citizen but applies for temporary
residency in Monopoly-land. He is told that as a condition for temporary
residency he must “waive” his rights to the $200 even though he will have every
right to pass Go. He agrees to this.
In this case, he is not pardoning or excusing anyone
from giving him $200. He is either relinquishing his eligibility
to the rights or not obtaining the eligibility to start with. In this context,
the term “waive the rights” means to relinquish or to decline the eligibility
for the benefits.
This is a less typical scenario and in a Halachic
framework it is called siluk (abdicating or declining
eligibility).
What comes out is that the English term “waive” is an
ambiguous term that means to “take a pass” on the benefits but it can mean by
way of relinquishing the benefits themselves to which he is eligible (mechila)
or by way of relinquishing the eligibility to get the benefits (siluk).
So now let’s go straight back to the waiver clause in
the PNA and repeat our opening question about the Maaseh Yedayim: When the husband “waives” his rights to his
wife’s earnings (at a future time), what is he doing?
Is it a mechila or a siluk?
Is it a mechila or a siluk?
Let us first assume that it is a mechila. The husband is being mochel her
Maaseh Yadayim back to her. (Note - Mechila is the term that is used in the Hebrew version)
If he is, there is good news and bad news.
The good news is a short and sweet Halacha in Ch”M 12:8
(one of the shortest in all of Shu”A):
Mechila does not require a kinyan.
Goodie! This means that a mere declaration, spoken in
front of witnesses or signed, is sufficient.
Now the bad news - Rema in Ch”M 209:4 (noted
previously):
And just as a person cannot transfer [by sale or gift] something that is not yet in existence, likewise one cannot be mochel something that is not yet in existence.
Uh-oh!
This is saying that one cannot pardon a “promised” (or
obligated) benefit before the benefit is in existence. One cannot be mochel
the $200 before he passes Go and is eligible to collect it.
So let’s talk about his wife’s earnings. The mechila
perspective means that the husband (to-be) is now agreeing that at a future time he
will be mochel (pardon or excuse) her obligation to turn over her
earnings to him. This “obligation” first comes about when she collects her
earnings from her customer, client or employer. Let’s say she is a wage earner
and earns $4500 (an arbitrary number). She gets paid promptly on the fifth of
each month. As soon as the paycheck
comes in, Chazal obligate her to forward it to her husband.
If he likes, he can pardon her obligation and let her
keep her paycheck. But on the fourth of the month, before it comes in, there is
not yet anything for her to forward to him. And, as such, there is nothing for
him to pardon. She will have an obligation tomorrow, but there is no obligation
in effect now. Moreover, this obligation is perpetual. It renews itself with
every paycheck just like she is passing Go. He has to reaffirm his mechila
with every paycheck or he can change his mind. He can always retract his mechila
from paycheck to paycheck.
Sof davar, with the mechila perspective, his
signed declaration before the wedding does not accomplish a thing. Nothing is
waived. She hasn’t earned anything for him to waive. Likewise for repeating the
declaration “at the time of the wedding.” Even if the PNA would read that he
repeats this waiver “at the time of the separation” won’t
accomplish anything. Even if they are already separated and fighting a pitched
battle, and even if he honored the agreement for some time, but now he changes
his position and wants to be more recalcitrant and demand her earnings (and he
is being held to pay mezonos), he can still retract his waiver.
One cannot be mochel something that has not yet
come into existence.
So how will Rabbi Willig, Shlita, respond to this?
Rabbi Willig is no Am Haaretz. And he will promptly
call me one and tell me to look at the SM”A in S.K. 21 and go directly to the
Rema in 209:8 not to pass go and not to collect $200. There, the Rema clearly
states that:
"even if one cannot transfer something that is not yet in existence he can base a condition on it and likewise to renounce (l’salek) himself and his power [of attorney] from something that is not yet in existence since he has not yet obtained it."
So he cannot be mochel in advance but he can be mesalek
(siluk). Or can he?
In theory, now that we are back in Siluk-land, we will
face many of the same problems that were discussed in Part 1. Still, in this
case there is a bit of very good news. We are no longer discussing siluk
from the dividends of property holdings but rather a siluk from a “shiabud”
(lien or obligation - words of the Nesivos HaMishpat ibid:28). As such, both
the Nesivos and the SM”A (S.K. 29) state that such a siluk does not
require a kinyan! A declaration (before witnesses) or signed statement
is sufficient.
This helps us (or Rabbi Willig) but not enough. The
rules of this siluk are based on the siluk of Nichsei Malug
in Kesubos 83, the only difference is that we are not talking about siluk
from a title to property but rather from a monetary shiabud. All the
other rules apply (see very lengthy Ktzos HaChoshen ibid.).
As such, can this siluk take effect before the
wedding?
All opinions hold absolutely not. This is why the PNA
adds the words about repeating the waiver afterward.
So, does it take effect at “the time of the wedding”?
It would, indeed, if this were when he wants the siluk
to take effect. But because he does not want it to take effect now and is
freezing it for later, it cannot.
Can it take effect at the time of the separation?
Believe it or not, this may actually work with the
declaration he makes now (if he is “deemed” to repeat it then) because, for
this shiabud, there is no need for a kinyan. However, the PNA
would need to expressly say that he is deemed to repeat the declaration at that
time (when the siluk takes effect) and this is not what it says.
So let’s say the PTB makes this change in the
agreement, have we solved our problems?
No, or more precisely, it depends who you ask. If you
ask the Shach or the Ktzos, perhaps it does. If you ask the Rema, Tumim or
Mohari”t )Rav
Yosef Matrani 1568-1639), it does not.
The issue at hand is that once we say that this siluk
can only take effect at the time of separation, what happens if he retracts his
siluk in the interim? Can he?
Moharit says he certainly can. The Ktzos disagrees. The
Ktzos also intimates that this is in line with the Rema in Ch”M 112:1
concerning a lien against a future acquisition. The Rema’s opening position is
even if one expressly earmarks a future acquisition for a lien, the lien cannot
take effect until the acquisition and in the meantime, he can retract it. He
follows this ruling with a terse “yesh cholkim (others disagree)”. This usually
means that the first opinion is primary. The Shach announces that the “yesh
cholkim” is the primary Halacha against the implication of the Rema. The Nesivos disputes this Shach based on the
Tumim and even the Ktzos.
So the retraction issue in this case seems to be a
strong dispute. Furthermore, it is not clear if those who maintain that the
husband cannot retract are talking only in a case that the siluk was
done with a kinyan.
The basic rule in Halacha is that the burden of proof
is upon side that is changing the status quo (motzi m’chezkaso). Hence,
if the siluk has not yet taken effect and the husband retracts it. We
need to follow the opinions that there is no siluk. (Of course, the BDA
will want to follow the other opinion and make the husband agree with their “kim
li” clause.)
Grand Summary
Let’s quickly summarize all of our angles:
Dividend Earnings (Peiros)
Declaration or kinyan before the wedding –
Waiver doesn’t take effect at all because he has no rights to waive.
Declaration at time of wedding –
Waiver doesn’t take effect at all because he doesn’t want it to take effect
yet.
Declaration at time of separation –
Waiver does not take effect at all because this requires a new kinyan. Husband
could make a kinyan at that time if he agrees to it.
Declaration before the wedding that at the
time of separation the current kinyan is effective me’achshav –
Either his interim use of the peiros negates the me’achshav and the waiver will
not take effect at all or the me’achshav negates the interim usage and takes
effect retroactively. This will make the husband liable for reimbursement. Also,
in the latter viewpoint, many poskim will hold that he can retract the siluk
order as long as it hasn’t taken effect.
Job Earnings (Maaseh Yedayim) by way of
Mechila
No advance declarations will take effect because the
job earnings have not yet come into existence (Ch"M 209:4).
Husband could waive them later once they are earned – if he agrees to it – but he can retract the waiver anytime and continue to collect.
Husband could waive them later once they are earned – if he agrees to it – but he can retract the waiver anytime and continue to collect.
Job Earnings (Maaseh Yedayim) by way of
Siluk
Declaration before the wedding –
Waiver doesn’t take effect at all because he has no rights to waive.
Declaration at time of wedding –
Waiver doesn’t take effect at all because he doesn’t want it to take effect
yet.
Declaration at time of separation (or
declaration now for the time of separation) –
Waiver may take effect. However, PNA needs to write this expressly. In addition, many
poskim will hold that he can retract the siluk order as long as it hasn’t taken
effect.
Declaration before the wedding that at the
time of separation the current declaration is effective me’achshav –
Same problems as Peiros.
Conclusion (to waiver issue)
One of the two commenters on my Part 1 post noted that “Furthermore,
even if this mechila doesn’t work the PNA is still extremely helpful for the
majority of cases where the wife’s income is not way above average.”
On the face of things, he is 100% correct if this is
the majority of cases. But we have to remember a few things.
Firstly, this entire PNA is predicated on the chiddush
of the Toras Gittin which is built around this waiver. So the waiver must be
solid.
We must also note that we are dealing with a couple who
are separated so the wife is living on her own. Today, most women have incomes
– especially those who leave their husbands - and it doesn’t take much income to
take the bite out of the PNA. I did a bit of googling and came up that a woman
in the US earns on the average $700-800 per week and for those in professional
or management positions it was a bit over $1000. So we are talking on the average
$3000-4000 per month to offset his $4500.
But there can also be some very serious ramifications. Everything
that I have written is working in line with the opinions that the PNA does not
automatically engender a forced get. I am only challenging the waiver aspect. One
can argue that my entire thesis on the frailty of the waiver is only a concern
if the husband is knowledgeable enough to challenge the validity of the waiver
or to retract it. Very few men from the circles that promote the PNA – mostly Modern
Orthodox working class – who don’t read my blog will be that knowledgeable.
But suppose some learned recalcitrant husband – or one
who gets a good toen - does indeed challenge or retract the waiver and demands
his wife’s earnings. Suppose the Bais
Din does not take his challenge seriously and they enforce the PNA agreement
even though the Halacha about his wife’s earnings may be on his side. In such a
case we are now dealing with a bona fide gold standard get meuseh l’mehadrin
that is invalid according to all opinions.
So it’s critical to take a good look at this waiver and
see if it really works. I have my doubts. The hitchayvut of the mezonos –
a controversy in itself – may be bolstered with a belt and suspenders. But the
waiver to the earnings has neither a belt nor suspenders. Nothing to hold up
its trousers.
In my humble opinion and based on the research I have
done, I don’t think the Emperor’s waiver has any close at all!
6 comments:
If the terms of the PNA make the husband obligated to pay his wife, upon separation, $300 a day (rather than the current $150 a day) supposedly for mezonos, even the RCA/BDA would admit (as told to me by one of the top BDA dayanim intimately involved in establishing the PNA) that it would render the PNA halachicly coercive (as it would then be a knas even if you claimed it is mezonos) and trigger a future Get Me'usa.
Well, even $150 a day, $50,000+ per year of after tax dollars for the support of one single woman (mezonos is separate and in addition to child support, if there even is minor children) is far into knas territory, long past mezonos, rendering a future Get Me'usa. How many men could even afford to spend after tax $50,000+ on their wife, on top of supporting themselve and their children? Very very few. And very few spend that much on their wife even during a happy marriage with her.
1) "So, does it take effect at “the time of the wedding”?
It would, indeed, if this were when he wants the siluk to take effect. But because he does not want it to take effect now and is freezing it for later, it cannot."
This is a critical mistake. Normally, at the time of the wedding the husband gets the right to the ma'asei yadayim. The siluk prevents him getting some of this right at the time of the wedding. He still gets the right to most of the ma'asei yadayim, but he is mistalek from the right to ma'asei yadyaim for the period after the couple's domestic residence ceases to be together.
2) Unless I have misunderstood, the writer implies that he doubts HRZN"G approved the newer version of the PNA. R' Willig says explicitly that the newer version also has his approval, and as I mentioned last time if anyone doesn't believe him he is invited to ask HRZN"G directly.
To R. Daniel, LOY"T
1) I understand what you are saying. I do not agree. I am considering to write a post to elaborate. In any case, the main issue is: can the husband retract the siluk before the "time" comes? For this question it does not make much difference if the "declaration" has an effect or not, so I don't see what is so "critical".
2) Rav Willig mentioned in a different shiur that they received an updated haskama from RZNG Shlita but, if they did, it doesn't show on their web site. I would like to see it.
YH
1) When 'the time' is is absolutely critical. Even if the husband can retract the siluk before 'the time' comes, as 'the time' is the time of the marriage he definitely cannot retract it after this time. And retracting before then won't help, as he has admitted the repetition of the siluk 'at the time of the wedding' (the validity of such an admission is not obvious, but this is addressed explicitly by R' Willig).
2) At the risk of repeating myself, whether or not RZNG shlita approved this can easily be clarified.
Stay tuned for a post... ;-}
(though it may take time - I have a bechina on Ch"M at the BDHG this Tues. iy"H and that is priority 1.)
Good Shabbos
YH
Rav Elyashiv and, more recently again, Rav Shternbuch have both ruled that the RCA prenup results in a Get Me'usa.
Hopefully the author here will explore those teshuvos and discuss their reasoning.
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