Major Extradition vs. Minor Extradition

 

Parshat Ki Teitzeh is upon us. This parshah is the last trove of essential mitzvos that we find before completing the Torah. One rather obscure prohibition that we find in this parshah (Devarim 23:16) is one that I have discussed at length throughout many a post:

לא תסגיר עבד אל אדוניו

You may not return a [runaway] slave to the custody of his current master.

What does this mean?

The Gemara in Gittin 45a explains that this law is referring to a Canaani slave that is owned by a proper Jew who lives outside of Eretz Yisrael. Whereupon, the slave fled from his master and took refuge in Eretz Yisrael. The pasuk is telling us that the Jewish authorities are forbidden to return the slave to his rightful master outside of Eretz Yisrael. Instead, they force the master to release the slave and the slave is required to reimburse the master for his market value.

Rambam in Sefer Mitzvos Lavim 254 explains why the slave is freed:

כיון שבא להסתופף בארץ הטהורה הנבחרת לעם הנעלה.

Since he wanted to be added into the pure land that was chosen for the exalted nation.

Sefer Chinuch (568) explains it slightly differently:

שרצה האל לכבוד הארץ שהבורח לשם ינצל מעבדות, כדי שניתן אל לבנו כבוד המקום, ונקבע בלבבנו בהיותנו שם יראת ה’ יתעלה. וכל זה להועיל לעמו ולזכותם כי חפץ חסד הוא.

 

That HKBH desired, for the honor of the land, that one who flees to there shall be spared from servitude. This is so we will take heart the honor of the place (Eretz Yisrael) and establish fear of the High G-d in our hearts when we are there. And all this is to benefit his nation and to confer merit on us for HKBH desires kindness.

The pirush of Chumash Torah Temimah explains that nobody should be forced to reside outside of Eretz Yisrael since it is a place of impurity and idolatry. One who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael is as if he has no G-d.

The astonishing thing is that this mitzva is referring to one who was not born Jewish and did not undergo a full conversion. He is only a quasi-Jew. He is not eligible to marry a Jewish woman. Yet, the Torah is expressly commanding to uphold his desire to live in Eretz Yisrael. Note – Upon being released, he is required to undergo a full conversion and keep all the mitzvos so, at the end of the day, we are indeed gaining a full-fledged Jew. Still, this status only comes after the mitzvah takes effect, not before, and still he is protected.

We can deduce by kal v’chomer that this mitzva is no less applicable to any regular Jew. Certainly, all the reasons stated by the Rishonim apply even more to a natural born Jew.

If so, why did the Torah seem to single out a slave for this mitzvah?

One obvious answer is to show us how far the kavod of Eretz Yisrael extends. It extends not only to a regular Jew but even to a quasi-Jew. But a more practical answer is that it is already a capital crime to forcibly relocate (kidnap) a free Jew from point A to point B even if both points are in Eretz Yisrael. This is known as gonev nefesh m'Yisrael. The only type of person that “we” are authorized to transport is a person who is the rightful property of somebody else. This would be a Canaanite slave. But it definitely applies to all Jews in the strange cases where it could apply, such as criminal extradition.

In case you have doubts, just check out Midrash Rabbah Breishis 94 (Vayigash). Here is what it says:

At the time that Nevuchadnetzer came up to conquer Yehoyakim (King of Judah), he settled by the walls of Antioch. The Great Sanhedrin approached to meet him and they asked him, “Has the time come for this house (Temple) to be destroyed?”.

 

He answered, “Not yet, but King Yehoyakim rebelled against me. Hand him over to me and I will go [in peace].” This implied that if he didn’t get the king, things won’t be very peaceful.

 

They went and told King Yehoyakim that Nevuchadnetzer has an arrest warrant for him (i.e., he should turn himself in for the sake of peace.) He told them, “Is this the right thing to do, to sacrifice one soul for the sake of another? Does the Torah not say ‘One may not reintern a slave back to his master’?” They responded, “Didn’t your own grandfather do the same to Sheva ben Bichri?” (Sheva ben Bichri was a wanted murderer whose crimes were known to all - YH.)

What do we see from this?

Yehoyakim was not only a full-fledged Jew but he was a Davidic King, no less. A King! And he argued that this mitzva concerning a Canaani slave applies to his case. And he would have been correct if not for the proviso that he had the status of Sheva ben Bichri. Clearly, this law is not limited to a slave.

This explanation of the mitzvah is the mainstream one. It is spelled out in the Gemara in Gittin and endorsed by Rambam, Chinuch, and SMa”G. It is also codified in Rambam (Avadim 8:6, 9, and 10) and in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:84,85. Shulchan Aruch goes out of its way to tell us that this law applies even in today’s times. Almost nobody entertains any other explanation of this pasuk, except Rashi.

Rashi likewise references the gemara in Gittin but this is only his second pshat. His first is to reference Targum Unkelos who wrote something a little bit different. Unkelos wrote: Do not hand over a non-Jewish slave of a non-Jewish master to that master after he ran to you for refuge.

According to Unkelos, we are talking about a total non-Jewish slave, not a quasi-Jewish “Canaanite” slave, but a non-Jewish one that belongs to a non-Jew. This has absolutely nothing to do with location. If the slave started out by a non-Jew in Israel and ran over to you when you live in Morocco, you cannot send him back to his owner in Israel. And if both the slave and the Jewish host live in Morocco, the Jewish host cannot send the slave back to his owner in Morocco. He must be freed in Morocco to stay there! Obviously, this assumes that the local authorities do not intervene on behalf of the owner.

The pirush of Chumash Torah Temima explains Unkelos’ viewpoint that this slave worshipped idols by his rightful owner and will resume doing so if he is sent back. Hence, it is forbidden to send him back so that there will be one less idolater in the world.

The other Rishonim do not seem to acknowledge Unkelos' pshat and it does not look like this pshat made it into Rambam or Shulchan Aruch or general Halacha. But, don’t totally forget it just yet.

Let’s get down to business.

The State of Israel identifies itself as the “Jewish Homeland”. As such, it is reasonable to expect that its laws should at least be modeled after traditional Jewish law.

Although the secular leftist Israeli judiciary is trying it’s hardest to divest the country of any semblance of Jewish identity, there are some areas where it just cannot be avoided. For one thing, the Jewish calendar is officially recognized as a valid dating system here in Israel. Likewise, the state recognizes the seventh day – “Saturday/Shabbat” – as the official off-day for the nation and acknowledges that it cannot legally compel those who observe Shabbos to violate it. The same applies to all Jewish holidays.

Another thing is that all matters of family and marital status – marriage, divorce, conversion, and mamzerut – are delegated to the Rabbinate. This goes so far, that the state itself will not allow for a genetic DNA test to be used to determine a case of questionable paternity that can lead to a status of mamzer unless the Rabbinate approves of it. I wrote about this at length (HERE and HERE).

More or less everything else – default monetary disputes and damages, criminal law, default inheritance, and real estate - is all governed by secular Western ideals. Sadly, this also includes extradition. The leftist Israeli law allows a full-fledged card carrying natural born Jew to be extradited away from Eretz Yisrael at the request of some other country. This is even if the accused is a full Israeli citizen. This was pivotal in the Malka Leifer episode. It is a disgrace. I have been lamenting about this for years.

So, let’s imagine that Israeli law would treat extradition like family law. Just like the court will not order a genetic test without the approval of the Rabbanut, let’s imagine that the court will not approve any extradition without the approval of the Rabbanut, as well. If this were so, I think it’s a safe bet that there is no chance that any Beis Din would approve of extradition – and mesira - for Mrs. Leifer.

A very recent incident enlightened me that there may be a second type of extradition. One that does not involve criminality or mesira. A type of a case where there can be justification to transport another human being who is not a slave from one place to another. What kind of a case?

A parental custody dispute of a minor.

A parent cannot set his small child free and send the child a bill for his market value. What if a couple had a family in chutz l”aretz and then split up. Then one side abducts a minor child and runs to Eretz Yisrael. Does Lo Tasgir apply here or not?

What if one parent is Jewish and one parent is not?

This can get very sticky. Let’s check out the story.

I saw this in a newsletter about interesting court cases (secular court). The story is in Hebrew. If you read Hebrew you can see it HERE (or use the page translation feature).

The title reads:

District Court Upholds: 6-Year-old boy abducted to Israel will be returned to his father

 

The story is about a tourist from Italy who came to Israel and got into a relationship with an Israeli woman. This “hookup” resulted in a baby boy. Evidently, the pair stayed together.

Initially they lived in Israel. After Oct. 7, they moved to Italy. They moved back to Israel in early 2024 and moved back to Italy later in 2024. Finally, in Jan. 2026, the couple split and the mother came to Israel with the now 6-year-old boy. As you may guess, the father filed kidnapping charges and demanded to forcibly send the boy back to Italy.

The mother claimed that the father is violent and attacked her on “Xmas Eve”. The father denies it. The Israeli court ruled that the mother failed to substantiate her claim of violence and that the abduction without the father’s consent or a hearing in Italy constitutes kidnapping by international law. The child must be sent back. The mother appealed in the District (Appellate) Court and was denied.

Based on standard international law and The Hague convention, the Israeli court was complying with the rules. There are no surprises here. But let’s play along with our fantasy that the Rabbanut must approve of all calls for extradition. How would they rule on this?

Of course, the first thing is to determine whether or not the child is Jewish. The story indicates that the couple celebrates Xmas. This implies that at least the Italian father is not Jewish. The mother may be Jewish, but if she is, she is very far from observance. But that shouldn’t make a difference.

Let’s examine a hypothetical case where both parents are Jewish. Yet, the father lives in Italy and the mother wants to live in Israel and she kidnapped the child to the Land of Israel. Is it the same Lo Tasgir? I noted above that a father is not a master. He cannot “free” his child.

Of course, we would need to know the standard Halachos about child custody when two estranged parents live in one country. Both live in Israel or both do not. The basic rule is that up to the age of six, all children are granted to the mother. From the age of six on, many poskim maintain that the boys should be housed by the father because a father has an obligation to teach his sons Torah.

Well and good. But now, we are discussing a father living in diaspora and a mother in Israel. If the father is an observant Jew, do his rights to custody still apply? Does the father’s obligation to teach Torah override the mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisrael? After all, we know the rule that one should not leave Eretz Yisrael except to learn Torah so, Torah learning overrides living in Israel. Or would we say there is a din of Lo Tasgir and the child must stay here and we would compel the father either to come to Israel or to relinquish custody?

Tzarich iyun gadol.

Then comes a situation where the Jewish father has no connection to learning or teaching Torah. How does this play into a standard domestic custody battle in one country? And in an multi-national one like this case, where even the father is Jewish but not observant, would we say that since this child isn’t about to be taught Torah no matter which parent he stays by, that the father can still assert his rights to take the boy out of Israel?

Teiku.

Now comes what looks to be the likely scenario here where the father is certainly not Jewish but the mother is. Hence, the child is Jewish. What would the Rabbanut do?

On the face of things, there is definitely a form of Lo Tasgir that can apply here. But still, a father is a father and the Rabbanut may not want to contest international law and the Hague Convention even at the expense of losing a Jewish Neshama.

And what if both parents are not Jewish?

This would seem to be a no-brainer. Let’s just send this Italian goy back to Italy - and the mother, too. But, wait!

According to Rashi, we have two explanations of Lo Tasgir. The second one concurs with most of the other Rishonim and the poskim that we are dealing with an Eved Canaani who wants to be free and to embrace Judaism. This certainly does not apply to a non-Jew.

But his first explanation, based on Targum Unkelos, tells us something surprising. Even if the slave is totally not Jewish, we should still offer him sanctuary to keep him away from idolatry. Perhaps, it may be contingent on his embracing Judaism, so it will not be applicable to a clueless non-Jewish six year old, but maybe it isn’t contingent.

And so, if the Rabbanut is unconcerned about defying international law and wants to follow the Halacha precisely, would it rule to block the extradition?

What would Unkelos say?

All I know is that Unkelos did not start off Jewish himself – and that he lived in Italy.