Tuesday, August 14, 2018

Techeiles 2 – Eilu V’Eilu and Two Watches


Author’s note – This post is Part 2 of a multi-part analysis of the integrity of the teachings of Chazal. It is a response to the assertion made by Rav Yisroel Reisman, shlita about whether or not to accept the Murex Trunculus snail as a candidate for the Talmudic Techeiles. Please see Part 1 HERE.



In our previous post, we noted that Chazal mean what they say and they do not distinguish between basic Halacha, details of Biblical or historical events, or scientific facts. We must rely on what they tell us. Such a task may not be so difficult if Chazal were totally consistent with themselves and when the facts they present are within reason and are supported by what we can observe. Yet, the truth is that the teachings of Chazal are full of inconsistencies. Some of these inconsistencies can be explained away or readily shrugged off. But some others leave us in no-man’s-land.

The inconsistencies that I want to discuss in this post come in three varieties:

·         Girsaos – textual discrepancies

·         Machlokes – disputes or differences of opinion among the sages

·         S’tiros – contradictions

All of these varieties enforce a witty remark that I once heard in my Yeshiva years and have never forgotten:

The man with one watch knows the time; the man with two watches is always in doubt!



Girsaos

Before we can try to understand what Chazal are telling us, we need to know precisely what they said. This can be a bigger challenge than we think.

The statements and stories of Chazal are often repeated several times throughout Jewish literature. In some cases there are several versions in Talmud Bavli. In some cases, there may be a similar passage in Bavli and another in Yerushalmi. Or sometimes a matching passage to Talmud Bavli is found in Misdrash Rabba or Tanchuma or Yalkut Shimoni. Of course there is the concise Pirkei Avos and the “expanded” Avos D’Rabi Nosson. Rarely are the statements totally identical. In many cases, an identical (or almost identical) passage is repeated in two places attributed to two different authors.

Before we go into Chazals that are doubled or tripled, even ones that have a single appearance in shas or Midrash can be fraught with discrepancies. Firstly, we know that Shas Bavli itself has gone through much repeat editing through the generations. There are words and phrases in older copies that do not appear in the current copies. The old copies of shas have corrections right there in the margins from the Bach, Gr”a, Reshash, Ein Mishpat, Maharav Ranshberg, and Shita Mekubetzes to name a few. More recent, updated copies of shas usually have sections in the back for “Dikdukei Sofrim” – editor’s corrections – or “Shinui Nushchaos” – text variations. 

To add to the confusion, all of the Aggadic material in Talmud Bavli was compiled into a “free standing” collection we call Ein Yaakov. In theory, it should just be a copy/paste from the Gemara.  Alas, there was no copy/paste before 1980, so this work was done manually. And so, we find hundreds if not thousands of nuance variations in the Ein Yaakov version of the very  Talmud Bavli that it came from!

Lastly, and most “annoying” in this category is that all through the writings of the Rishonim, they are quoting passages from the Talmud. Even where we know of no other text variation, we find Rishonim who quote the text slightly differently from our current version. And we wonder: Are they accurately quoting the girsa they had in their personal copy of Talmud or are they quoting verbatim and being a little sloppy?

I can fill volumes with examples but, for this post and in the girsaos category I will limit myself to two examples. The first example goes back to a discrepancy between what we think are three instances of the same Chazal in three places in Shas – Sanhedrin 22a, Sota 2a, and Moed Kattan 18b – where Chazal pronounce the immortal words: “Bas ploni l’ploni”. I wrote an entire post about this in the Shidduchim series titled Barshert is Barshert. No?

I noted that in Sota and Sanhedrin, the text is virtually identical. Actually, the only difference that I found was that in our Shas the term in Sota is “zug rishon” and “zug sheini” and in Sanhedrin it says “zivug rishon” and “zivug sheini”. In Ein Yaakov, you will find the term “zivug” in both places. But the version in Moed Kattan is very different. Firstly, it attributes the statement to Rav Yehuda amar Shmuel as opposed to Rav Yehuda amar Rav. More important, it does not say that this bas kol comes out after 40 days but on each and every day.

Are we dealing with two conflicting versions of the same statement for which we are not sure if this originated with Rav or with Shmuel, or are they two different statements, one stated by Rav and one stated by Shmuel? If the latter, is Rav arguing with Shmuel? What is their dispute and why don’t they agree?

I examined all of these possibilities in my post, you can check out my conclusions there.

And why is this so important?

Because the entire issue of whether there is such a thing as a “barshert” for a girl rides on this discrepancy!

The second example of text discrepancy relates to my last variation – where the Rishonim do not seem to quote the Talmud as we have it written. And who is the guilty party in this example?

Rabban Shel Yisrael ­­– Rashi!

At the end of Parshat Balak, Rashi gives us his commentary on the episode with Zimri ben Saleu. In Bamidbar 25:6 Rashi writes the details: 


The tribe of Shimon converged upon Zimri and said to him: We are being judged for death and you are just sitting…as is related in HaNisrafim (Sanhedrin 82).

Rashi in Chumash is specifically referring us to the account recorded in Sanhedrin 82 and everything is just dandy... as long as one does not actually look up Sanhedrin 82. But if he does, he may notice some very innocent looking differences. The first is very trivial. It does not say the tribesmen “converged” upon Zimri but that they simply “went” to Zimri. Not very important but it diminishes the drama just a drop. But the other discrepancy jumps out at us. It does not say “We are being judged for death…” but rather “They are judging capital judgments…”

This may look like two ways of saying the same thing, but there is much room to give different interpretations on the two different versions. Here, as well, once upon a time, I wrote a very lengthy essay on the Zimri incident (not available on my blog) and I pointed out this discrepancy and what the ramification may be. It is too involved for this post (if interested, you can contact me privately to learn more), but one thing is certain - Rashi is clearly misquoting the gemara, and we must wonder why.

Did Rashi do this on purpose? Is it possible that Rashi did not have a copy of Sanhedrin available and was writing the text from memory and simply made a mistake? Can someone as great as Rashi make a mistake? Is it possible that Rashi had  different girsa in the text of Sanhedrin? If so, why did he not mention it in the gemara itself? Is Rashi in Chumash purposely changing the girsa to his own version? Why???

Trust me, this is by no means a lone occurrence in Rashi. It’s a bit endemic. In Devarim 20:3 Rashi comments on the term Shma Yisrael that is declared by the Kohen before a military campaign: 


Even if you have no merit other than Kriat Shma you are worthy that HKBH will save you.


This is attributed to the gemara in Sota 42a only there it says: 


Even if you only fulfilled Kriat Shma morning and night, you will not be submitted into their hands.

Is the gemara insisting that one at least fulfills Kriat Shma twice a day each day and is Rashi lowering the requirement to just once in one’s lifetime? By what authority does Rashi make this change? Or, if Rashi means precisely the same as the gemara, why is his terminology different?

This can make a world of difference to a chiloni in the IDF!

The point of all of this is to assert that when there is more than one source for a statement, it is like having two watches. And even when there is just one source, there is always a chance that the passage of Chazal that you read is different than the original passage that they wrote!



Machlokes

The confusion we get with girsa problems is not intentional. They are due to inaccurate transmission from master to student (game of broken telephone), mistakes and human error. It’s like we own one watch and then we just find a second one.

We get just as confused when there is absolutely no issue with the text accuracy. It is when Chazal simply do not agree with each other. It’s like inviting all your uncles to your bar mitzvah and being handed a watch by each one of them. Worse, it’s like one uncle giving you two watches!

The concept of three Jews and 30 opinions is iconic to Torah observant Jews. It is deeply rooted in our tradition. Almost every Halachic nuance is couched in Machlokes. Machlokes Tanayim, Machlokes Amorayim, Machlokes Rishonim, Achronim, Poskim, etc.  It is in our blood. So much so, that a machlokes in “what happened?” is just as natural as a machlokes in “what is the Halacha?”

I may be the only one, but I find such types of machlokes (the "what happened?" ones) a little bit disturbing.

Halacha is one thing because Halacha is philosophy. It is quite normal and natural for different folks to think differently. כשם שפרצופיהם שונים כך דעותיהם שונות. Just as every individual looks unique, every individual thinks uniquely. And all the opinions can be equally valid. אלו ואלו דברי א-לקים חיים!

Of course, we cannot allow different Halachos unique for each individual in a cohesive social environment so we must establish guidelines to determine which Halachic opinions prevail for society at large, regardless of whether it sits well with the individual. So machlokes in Halacha doesn’t bother us. 

In fact, we appreciate the machlokes because it validates our uniqueness. Any individual can tell himself that even if the established Halacha does not fit my viewpoint, there are authorities who support my viewpoint which makes it valid. Actually, when it comes to monetary cases, we may actually hold that each side is Halachically valid. This is what created the monstrous Kim Li that drives all tov’im mad and was the subject of a recent post.

But the Aggadita that discusses historical events and natural sciences are quite another thing. This is not philosophy but purported fact. If there is no agreement among our sages as to what are the facts, then none of the facts can be relied on as being valid.

If two watches are not synchronized, we cannot rely that either one is accurate.

Here is an excerpt of a post that I wrote ten years ago regarding the list of Tzaddikim who never died an earthly death:


Although we live and breathe the words of Chazal, we cannot always consider their statements to be conclusive because they are often subject to conflicting Midrashim or a range of opinions among Chazal themselves. To point out a few examples, on the same page I note that there are at least 3 opinions as to which shevet produced Eliyahu HaNavi. The contention that he is a Cohen and that he is Pinchas is compromised thereby. Also, see footnote 25 on page 102 (in my book) where I bring conflicting sources as to which tzadikkim were born circumcised including a head-on collision concerning Bilaam. Another example is a controversy as to whether Zimri was actually Shlumiel ben Tzurishadai which contradicts a Midrash that all of the original nesiim died in the maaseh Korach (according to Rabbenu Bechaye). There are numerous other examples of this. 

One of the wildest "other examples" is the long sugya in Bava Basra 15a-b. Who was Iyov and when did he live?

Opinions range from Jewish to non-Jewish, from the days of Yaakov (he was husband of Dina), to the days of Moshe, the days of the Shoftim, Nevuchadnetzer, Achashverosh, that he was from the returnees of Ezra and had a Yeshiva in Teveria and, finally, that he never existed and is only a fable.

Each "contestant" presents his scriptural reference but, of course, each one’s reference is passed over by all the other opinions. Each individual opinion turns out to be an overwhelming minority. So, at the end of the daf/day, where do we stand on this? Who was Iyov? When did he live?

How many “watches” do we need?

And how are we supposed to respect all of the scriptural references when they are overlooked and “contradicted” by everyone else’s scriptural references?

The same goes for the identity of the fruit of the Eitz Hada'as. Talmud Bavli quotes a Braitha in two places (with several minor text discrepancies) which present three opinions:

  • Rabi Meir - A vine, because wine and alcohol is the source of all of our woes.
  • Rabi Nechemiah - A fig tree, because from the instrument of downfall comes the remedy.
  • Rabi Yehuda - A wheat stalk, because ­– says Rabi Yehuda on his own with no supporting source – a child will not begin to speak until he has tasted from grain.

The gemara itself does not suggest an Esrog. This is only in Midrash Rabba. But a thorough look there will send us straight to the wine cabinet.

Firstly, in Midrash Rabba, Rabi Meir is the one who suggests wheat, not Rabi Yehuda. Then comes Rabi Yehuda and he suggests grapes. This is a total reversal of credits. He also backs it up with a pasuk (Devarim 32:32), not just a concept. After this comes Rabi Abba from Acco who suggests the Esrog, and running fourth, Rabi Yosi (not Rabi Nechemia) is credited with the fig opinion.

This is as much as most of us know. The Midrash continues a bit further with two more suggestions that we are not familiar with­ – a “brat sheva” and a “brat alita”. But then comes the part that most of us never heard, but we should:


Rabi Azaria…in the name of Rabi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Chas v’shalom! HKBH has not revealed the type of tree to Man and will not do so in the future! See what it says that if a woman sins with a beast, the beast is likewise executed. Why so? So that it (the beast) should not later pass through the public domain and people will say that this beast was the one that brought about the execution of so and so. And if HKBH is concerned to preserve the dignity of the offspring of Adam HaRishon, certainly it is concerned to preserve his dignity.

Now, this sounds very reasonable to me, but evidently, Rabi Meir, Rabi Yehuda, Rabi Nechemiah/Yosi, and Rabi Abba of Acco do not agree with this and they think that it is important to know what type of tree the Eitz Hadaas was. So, if somebody asks any of us right now, “What type of tree was the Eitz Hada'as?”, what will be our answer?

Incidentally, there is a shita from Rav Amram Gaon that it was a nut tree (egoz) and many understand the Ibn Ezra (Breishis 3:6) to hold that it was a unique one-of-a-kind aphrodisiac fruit tree (Viagra?) which cannot be found anywhere else on earth (though they haven’t stopped looking for it). The Ibn Ezra actually refers to some of the popular opinions and argues with their premise. Can a Rishon argue with a Tanna?

Well, as long as other Tannaim are arguing with this Tanna, then why can’t we?

Personally, if I had a vote, I would suggest a coffee tree because the pasuk says: And the eyes of both of them opened and they realized that they weren’t dressed…

All of this implies that learning the identity of the fruit of the Eitz Hada'as is merely an academic exercise but, nevertheless, something that we cannot hope to be conclusive about. And certainly nothing that we can build Halacha around. Yet, the gemara in Brachos 40a indicates otherwise.

The gemara wants to understand the intent of the Mishna that says if one inadvertently recites Borei pri ha’eitz on a vegetable that the Bracha is invalid. Isn’t this obvious? The only answer the gemara can present is that the intention of this Halachic Mishna is to reject the opinion of Rabi Yehuda that claims the Eitz Hada'as was wheat. This would indicate that if one wishes to eat raw wheat, he is allowed to recite Borei pri ha’eitz since, according to Rabi Yehuda, the Torah calls a wheat stalk “eitz”.

Yes, indeed, Chazal take their Aggadic literature very seriously.



S’tiros

So now, after dealing with textual discrepancies and cases where Chazal themselves present multiple opinions within a given passage, we need to discuss cases where one passage of Chazal flatly contradicts another and is not presented as a machlokes.

Of course, these things happen in Halacha all through Shas. The gemara usually settles it in one of two ways: Ha Mani (who is the author of this Halacha?) and Hacha B’mai Askinan (in what kind of case are we dealing here as opposed to the original case?).

Ha mani is essentially telling us that even though we did not know there is a machlokes on this issue, we have now learned that there is. Hacha b’mai askinan forces us to make a modification in one of the contradictory cases to make a distinction between the two, thus essentially solving the contradiction by saying that they are two different scenarios and the Halacha changes from one to the other.

Here again, the second approach will work with philosophy of Halacha but cannot work with facts or events. Sometimes we can resolve the contradiction by finding some middle ground between the two contradictory passages, which usually challenges some of our assumptions and mitigates the impact of the maamar Chazal. But other times, there is no way to reconcile and we must dig up who is the author of this Aggadita versus the other and declare that they differ (back to machlokes) or that these two pieces just do not get along.

It’s like solving the contradiction of two watches by saying that neither is right and the true time is somewhere in between or by saying that one of them is definitely right and the other wrong but you are not sure which one.

One of my favorite examples is staring us in the face in Taanis 23a. At the top of the page the gemara describes the meaning of “gishmeichem b’itam” – rains in their proper time – to mean that it will rain regularly only on Wednesday nights and Friday nights. The gemara backs up this description by a case example: 


And so we find in the days of Shimon ben Shetach that the rains fell on Wednesday nights and Friday nights and the crops grew until the wheat was like kidneys, barley like olives and lentils like gold coins…

The impression that I took form this gemara is that this was the standard rainfall all through the tenure of Shimon ben Shetach. Similar to the gemara (Kesubos 77b) that there were no rainbows in “the days” of Rabi Yehoshuah ben Levi (and Rabi Shimon Ben Yochai). His generation was especially righteous. They fulfilled Im bechukosai telechu with all the mitzvos and ameilus b’Torah, so they got “gishmeichem b’itam”.

But, further down on the very same daf, in a seemingly unrelated sugya, we see the famous story of Choni Hame’agel. There was a drought and the nation called upon Choni who was the Baba Sali of the generation. He drew a circle and declared that he will not step out of the circle unless it rains. Sure enough, his entreaties were answered. Although Choni was the kadosh or mekubal of the generation and a miracle worker, he was not the Nasi. And the Nasi called him out for his brazenness. And, who was the Nasi? Says the gemara:


Shimon ben Shetach sent to him: If it weren’t that you are the holy Choni, I would decree upon you a nidui…but, what can I do? You are like a bratty child who fools around in front of his father and yet his father pampers his child…

So there was a severe drought in the times of Shimon ben Shetach? So severe that they needed to call upon a baal mofes to get them out of it? But wasn’t it such a righteous generation of Im becukosia telechu and timely rains and enormous crops?

Well, of course we can easily dismiss this contradiction by saying that my initial assumption was incorrect. The timely rains did not occur constantly throughout his tenure as the Nasi, but rather it was a one-time occurrence that happened sometime during his term. But, yet, I am taken aback by two things: (1) I have yet to find a single commentator that even notices this ambiguity and (2) the polar extremities of these two episodes.  Perhaps we can explain the second point by saying that that generation was ruled by a midas hadin so their devout years were rewarded very handsomely and their sinful years were punished very severely.

The interesting thing is that this Aggadic lesson about the timely rains is likewise incorporated into a Halachic discussion in Chullin 119b about whether the peels or shells of produce are counted when determining their size for tumaas ochlin. Once again, Chazal take their Aggadic lessons very seriously.

The next contradiction is a more serious one and I covered it in this post about Who received Eretz Yisrael directly after the flood? Once again our culprit is Rashi who generally bases his commentary of chumash on the words of Chazal.Here is what I wrote there:

To summarize, the Talmud Bavli, Rashi in Breishis 1:1, and the Chumash in Breishis 10:9 all seem to indicate that Cham was the original legitimate sovereign of Eretz Israel. Yet, Rashi here (Breishis 12:6) insists that Shem initially inhabited it and Cham stole it from him!

Who was here first?

This makes quite a difference if you are trying to explain our claim to Eretz Yisroel on some liberal college campus.

I noted in that post the great commentator on Rashi, Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi, a later Rishon, threw up his hands in despair. I wrote:

Numerous commentators make note of this contradiction and at the forefront is Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi (RE"M) who makes a note of it in all three spots (Breishis 1:1 and 12:6 and Bamidbar 13:22). And he repeats the same mantra throughout: These are contradictory aggadoth and Rashi acknowledges both. In Breishis 1:1 he points out that Rashi is prone to doing this in multiple instances in Chumash.

So we learn here that the RE”M concedes that not every internal conflict in Chazal can be answered. We must come to terms with the fact that, despite our mantra of Eilu v’Eilu divrei elokim chaim, reality cannot support both versions. They cannot both be “what happened”.

Incidentally, I did find a way to reconcile the contradictory aggadot in that post, but I was only able to do so by taking the Rashi in Breishis 12:6 out of its simple meaning and to say that the sons of Cham did not conquer Eretz Yisroel by force but by license from the sons of Shem.

The next contradiction that I want to discuss brings us back to the story of Achitofel that we mentioned in our initial post as well as our multiple personality disorder about Iyov that I discussed earlier in this post.

We may be familiar with the gemara in Sanhedrin 106a that says: Three people were involved in that council (to enslave the Jews in Egypt) – Iyov, Yisro, and Bilaam. Iyov was silent, Yisro bolted, and Bilaam stayed and voted for enslavement.  This was about 140 years before the Exodus (after the passing of Yosef). Even if we place Bilaam at 13 years old then, he would be no less than 193 years old at the time of the war with Midian in which he died.

Now, let’s recall our previous post where we mentioned that the premise to say that Achitofel was only 33 years old at his death comes from a pasuk in Tehillim 55 which says that “murderous deceitful people will not live to half of a [normal] lifetime” (a normal lifetime is 70 years). We understand that these chapters in Tehillim were written by Dovid Hamelech about his arch enemies, Doeg and Achitofel (according to the Braitha, Doeg made it to 34).

But at the top of Sanhedrin 106b, where Rabi Chanina is responding to the inquiry of a heretic, he applies this pasuk to Bilaam, as well, and continues on to claim that Bilaam died in his early 30s. (Incidentally, Bilaam was not on Dovid’s wanted list and is not included in the Braitha about Achitofel.) The heretic supported Rabi Chanina's “drush” by saying that he himself saw a protocol that confirms Bilaam’s age at 33 at when he was killed by "Pinchas the marauder". Hence, Bilaam would be much too young to have been an adviser to Pharaoh 180 years earlier. He would even be too young to have lived during mattan Torah (39 years earlier) and this contradicts the gemara in Zevachim 116a that says he was there. 

Both of these claims – the 193 or so years of age and the 33 years of age – are in Sanhedrin 106 so it’s very difficult to overlook this contradiction. And, sure enough, Rashi on the spot takes it on.  Rashi seems to have no way out except to say that the first statement (193) was said by Rav Simai and the current statement (33) was said by Rabi Chanina and never the twain shall meet.

Once again, this leaves us 21st century dwarfs in limbo. Should we take this story about Bilaam advising Pharaoh seriously or not? Rav Simai is a card-carrying member of Chazal and he says, Yes. But Rabi Chanina is likewise a card-carrying member of Chazal and he says, No. We revere and cherish them both.

Rashi finds no way to reconcile the two opinions, like to say that perhaps, Rabi Chanina agrees to Rav Simai but he was talking to the mindset of the heretic.  Or perhaps to say there was more than one Bilaam just as there was more than one Pharaoh (or more than one Nimrod) - Bilaam Sr. and Bilaam Jr.  Of course, both of these explanations are “stretches” (like Batya’s arm), but if we do not use them, we are left wearing two watches.

We would love to put our full trust in Chazal [believe all is binding] and believe that if Chazal tell us that Bilaam was 33 when he died, then he was 33 when he died. We would likewise love to trust Chazal and believe that if Chazal tell us that Bilaam was one of three advisors to Pharaoh 140 years prior to the Exodus, then Bilaam was one of three advisors to Pharaoh 140 years prior to the Exodus. But both cannot be true.

Rashi says so.

We can only conclude, as Rashi indicates, that members of Chazal did not always agree or support the other’s opinion and we are forced to discount at least some of the descriptions of Chazal as not binding. We are like children who watch their parents fight. We can convince ourselves that both are right but we cannot fully trust either one.

My final entry (for this post) is the contradiction about Ruth’s nationality. This was the topic of a blog post back in Sept of 2008 (wow, ten years!). Here are the facts of the contradiction as I wrote it then (nothing has changed):

·       Rashi in BaMidbar (22:4) quotes a Midrash Tanchuma that claims that Balak was actually Midyani.

·       Talmud Bavli (Sotah 47a and three other places) maintains that Balak was a direct ancestor of Ruth and two places indicate the ancestry to be directly patrilineal.

·       In Yevamos 78b and Rambam (Hilchos Issurei Biah 12:21) it is ruled that for non-Jews, nationhood is determined by patrilineal ancestry.

·       Therefore, Ruth actually has the Halachic status of a Midyani and not Moavi. This means that there would be no grounds for the controversy during the time of Boaz if Ruth is fit to convert and again when Doeg HaAdomi challenged Dovid's legitimacy (Yevamos 76b). This would also negate Ruth’s bloodline to Lot which is taken for granted by Chazal (Bava Kamma 38b; Midrash Rabba Breishis 41, 50).

The post concluded that there is no comfortable way to solve this contradiction. The easy way out is like the Rashi in Sanhedrin 106 and Rabbenu Mizrachi - the maamarei Chazal argue with each other. Only Talmud Bavli says that Ruth descended from Balak. Midrash Tanchuma does not say so. Only Tanchuma says that Balak was Midyani, Talmud Bavli does not say so. 

So we can easily say that Talmud Bavli does not agree with Midrash Tanchuma, but of course, this brings us back to not being able to trust either watch –or either “parent”. If you refer to the post, you will find a few other possible solutions, but all of them carry some sacrifice on our desire to view the words of Chazal as literal and immutable.

And so we conclude Part 2 of the Techeiles discussion. In Part 1, we learned how seriously Chazal respect the statements of their “members”. In Part 2, we have learned that not all of their members say the same thing and their tendency to accept all of these statements so literally and seriously is what makes the contradictions so difficult to solve.

We are not done yet. Stay tuned for more…

Thursday, August 2, 2018

Shaketz Tishaktzenu V'Taev Titaavenu... - Repost from Parshat Nitzavim 5777



Here in the holy city of Yerushalayim, the upcoming Gay Parade is the talk of the town. Interestingly, the day began unusually overcast, almost unheard of in early August. The overcast has been off and on but it steadily has been unseasonably cloudy all day. The humidity in Yerushalayim is oppressive.

It looks as if the Heavens themselves are making their protest. All we are missing is the ominous rainbow.

The protest by the Jewish bloggers that I posted this morning was an eleventh hour effort by one of the sponsors. Kol Hakavod to him. I am certain that if he got off to an earlier start he would have gotten more signatories. Interestingly, every blogger who participated lives here in Eretz Yisrael except the organizer himself. 

As in past years Lehava will be staging a counter-protest (see HERE). My Eli - Lehava Activist - plans to be there. Yerushalayim is not Sodom!

To impress the urgency of this shameful event, I thought it is worthwhile to repost my post from last year Parshat Nitzavim. Here it is:


Going Down Under to a Whole Nother Level

I was checking in with my friends in the RCANZ and RCV in Australia and the prognosis isn’t good. I glanced at their charts and saw some bold WNLs. Not "Within Normal Limits" and not "We Never Looked". It seems they have gone down under to a "Whole Nother Level".

In this week’s Parsha (Nitzavim), the Torah – via Moshe Rabbeinu - warns us about deviating from the mitzvos. It warns us not to be over-secure and to think “I will be okay even if I pursue my heart’s desires” for “Hashem will not be willing to forgive him…”

Right in between these two phrases, Moshe throws in a strange comment: למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה “so to be adding the satiated on to the thirsty”.

What does this mean?

Rashi tells us, based on Onkelus, that it means he (the sinner) will be “including the involuntary sins together with the willful ones” on his rap sheet.  “Satiated” really means inebriated and “thirsty” means sober.  When one is inebriated he is not in full control of his faculties so he has some kind of an excuse for doing inappropriate things. When one is sober he has no such excuses. 

Rashi goes on to explain that if one commits sins due to involuntary circumstances or duress (inebriated), HKBH is willing to be lenient (forgiving) when judging him. However, once he commits the same sins willfully and when there is no duress (sober), not only is he punished for these willful transgressions, but all the involuntary ones are tacked on to his rap sheet. So in this case, the involuntary (inebriation driven) sins are added to the voluntary (sober) ones.

He has upped the ante and has brought the sinfulness WNL – to a Whole Nother Level.

A perfect example is that it is very common for young men who are unmarried to be unable to withstand natural temptations and they fall in shmiras habris. We hope that HKBH will be very forgiving of this iniquity being that there is basically nowhere to go. But, once the young man marries, he can be expected to channel his temptations to the proper address and do teshuva for the past. This pasuk indicates that, if so, he will get off easy. In the past, he was “inebriated” – not in full control.

However, if even under these circumstances, when he has permissible options, he continues with this behavior, he is in trouble. He is “sober” now and more responsible to stay out of mischief. If he continues on the same path, he is demonstrating retroactively that he never did care to avoid this behavior. As such, not only will he have to answer for his current “sober” behavior, he will have to answer for his past “inebriated” behavior, as well.

Chazal tell us that no man is free of “cheht”. Cheht (חטא) means a human failing. A misstep. All of us do these. We can almost tell HKBH that we are “inebriated” and under duress. Hopefully, we’ll get off the hook. But when these activities become more willful and enter the realm of avon (עון) and pesha (פשע), we have brought things to a Whole Nother Level.

Let’s cut to the chase.

The Midrash Rabbah in Breishis 26:9 states:


Rav Huna says in the name of Rebbi – The generation of the Flood was not obliterated from the world until they [reached a stage where they] were writing gimumsiot – marriage contracts – to a fellow male or to a beast.

The message here is that even though mankind had degenerated to the point of rampant homosexuality or bestialty, nevertheless, as long as society officially considered it a taboo, HKBH was not angered enough to take the extreme step of destroying mankind. But once these practices became institutionalized as legitimate (alternative?) behavior, human society had reached the point of no return and had to be extinguished.

HKBH can tolerate this promiscuity as long as those who engage in it at least acknowledge that they are doing something immoral. But once it is redefined as moral, they have brought themselves down to a Whole Nother Level. As a consequence, this brought the waters of the Tahom Rabba up to a Whole Nother Nevel.

And so the gemara in Chullin 92a tells us:


Ulah says that this verse (the reference to 30 silver pieces in Zechariah 11:12) corresponds to the 30 commandments that the Bnei Noach accepted upon themselves, [and yet] they only uphold three of them.  (1) They do not write marriage contracts to fellow males (2) They do not sell the flesh of the dead in butcher shops (3) They respect our Torah.

Rashi explains:


Even though the non-Jews are suspect for homosexuality, and they even designate personal partners for their purposes, they are not so light-headed with this [negative] commandment to the extent that they will write to them marriage contracts.

This says that even though they are audacious enough to wantonly transgress 27 out of the 30 mitzvos that they accepted, they have the prudence not to transgress on these three – at the head of which is the taboo for institutionalizing homosexuality and same-sex marriage. They have learned from the Great Flood that nothing angers HKBH more. It’s a very dangerous line to cross. Don’t mess with this.

This is a Whole Nother Level.

We see that in the times of Chazal, homosexuality (Same Sex Attraction – SSA) was as common as it is today. Still it was acknowledged within Judaism and without that it is not a good idea for Jew or non-Jew alike to give this condition the imprimatur of “marriage”.

A lot has changed since then.

In July of 2010 a 12-point Statement of Principles on the Place of Jews with a Homosexual Orientation in Our Community was released which currently has about 200 signatures from Modern Orthodox rabbis and laypersons. The gist of the statement was to say that even though our Halacha does not support SSA activity, the greater community needs to be compassionate and accepting of the struggles of those who are affected with it.  To its credit, in Principle 11, it expressly distanced itself from any kind of approval of “same-sex commitment ceremonies or weddings”.

I wrote a post about this Statement about two days later which basically echoed some of the objections of other pundits, predominately of one commenter on the Emes V’Emunah site that calls himself ClooJew. The most significant excerpt of his comment is this (emphasis mine):


By underscoring "our obligation to treat human beings with same-sex attractions and orientations with dignity and respect," the signatories go beyond dignity and respect, and enter the grey zone toward legitimization. Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the inherent nature of a public pronouncement is to overemphasize the facts it pronounces. This is what the activist agenda of the gay community thrives on. The reason for gay pride parades is not simply to announce but to publicize and promote.

What Mr. ClooJew was expressing is that, even if we can deem the entire statement Halachically acceptable, what in Heaven’s name is the purpose of composing it? Liberal minded progressive Jews have no need for such a statement and right wing traditionalists like me will not appreciate it. So who was it written for?

Is there some “undecided” swing vote that they were targeting? Not on this issue, there isn’t.

He smells, as do I, a covert agenda which is a subtle step toward legitimization. To confirm this notion, I noted in my post that this statement was starkly devoid of a sense of reciprocity in terms of requiring the SSAs to acknowledge the sensitivities of us straights who strangely think that Klal Yisroel is meant to be a Mamleches  Kohanim and a Goy Kadosh. Indeed, one apologetic commenter wanted to claim that this was implied in a short phrase in Principle 7 which suggests that the SSAs need to take into consideration the “needs of the community” when deciding whether to be open about their orientation.  I personally reject this suggestion as grossly inadequate since it is written in the same sentence that contends that this decision is theirs alone to make.

Beyond that, at the end of my post I pulled out the clincher, but I need to rephrase was I was saying.

The statement was heralded as a call for acceptance and understanding and was trying very hard to avoid giving the impression that it was suggesting legitimization. However, if this was the sincere aim of this body, they would need to make an extra effort to denounce a sister movement that is openly promoting full legitimization. I noted that this statement was released a mere few days before the exceedingly audacious and provocative Gay Parade that is deliberately held in Yerushalayim Ir HaKodesh. If this group was sincere about calling for acceptance without legitimization, it would behoove them to speak out strongly against this abominable provocation and Chillul Hashem which took place merely two or three days later. Their silence was deafening. To my knowledge there is not a single signatory on record who spoke out against this perennial debacle.

למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה...

In my recent post about The RCANZ Revisited, I noted that at least two members of the RCANZ Executive committee are signatories on this statement – Rabbi James Kennard of Mt. Scopus College in Melbourne (hometown of Millie Fontana) and Rabbi Alon Meltzer, spiritual leader of Canberra, ACT (where Millie spoke to Parliament - well worth listening to but I cannot advocate watching her). And I also noted something else.

The statement that was released in 2010 was satisfied to refer to this group as “Jews who have a homosexual orientation” or “same-sex attractions” or the like but, yet, “struggling to live their lives in accordance with halakhic values”. As I noted, this implies Jews who look like regular Jews and dress like regular Jews and in all other areas of life, behave like regular Jews. It very aptly and wisely did not hop onto the alphabet train. It seemed to be referring to those who are not in control of their “sexual orientation “and can be considered “inebriated” or “involuntary” in the sinfulness of this condition.

However, subsequent statements by some of the signatories of this document, in particular Rabbi Alon Meltzer of the Executive Committee of the RCANZ, extend this declaration to the more degenerate cars on the alphabet train – the BTQs on the LGBTQIA line.

The Bi-sexuals are shtufei zima plain and simple. They are not SSA (same sex attraction) but rather ASA (any sex attraction –AC/DC). They are forbidden in yichud with anybody. There can be no tolerance for this. Of course, if they are married to opposite gender spouses and have genuine kids, the kids are as kosher as anybody’s.

The Ts and Qs have more than just their sexual orientation messed up. I suppose a good percentage of them are not rational and can be Halachically deemed as shotim and are exempt from all positive mitzvos in the Torah (they are still not permitted to knowingly engage in arayos or any negative commandments). But if any of them are rational, there is no way to accept or excuse their lifestyle.

The Torah commands us to be Kedoshim and forbids us from numerous degenerate practices that are not intrinsically sexual (though they all come in one package). This includes cross-dressing (Lo Yilbash), weird hairstyles that almost always involve shearing the payos (Lo Takifu), tattoos (Ktovat Kaaka), and things like flashy clothes and body piercing can all go into the umbrella issur of Bechukoseihem lo teilechu. And a sex-change operation for a man is sirrus. All told, these are not people whose only “crime” is that they are looking for loving committed relationships in a family setting, just from the wrong side of the mechitza. And these are not people “struggling to live their lives in accordance with halakhic values” even if they keep kosher and Shabbos (they sure don’t keep Taharas HaMishpacha!)

This is “adding the satiated on to the thirsty”. This is taking the SSA temptation to a Whole Nother Level. This is what we call a “slippery slope”.

All the way down to the Tahom Rabba.

So now we can finally talk about current events.

Australia adopted a law in 1961 called The Marriage Act and amended it in 2004 as the Marriage Amendment Act. This law is currently in force and it states that “marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” As such, same-sex couples are legally unable to be wed in Australia. Kol Hakavod.

Over the past decade there has been a growing demand to change the law to allow same-sex marriages, but this would require a popular vote, or a plebiscite. A plebiscite can only be done as an act of Parliament and, so far, Parliament was unable to garner the support for such a plebiscite because (drum roll…) it’s too expensive. So they proposed to conduct the vote via a Postal survey which does not require Parliamentary approval. This was challenged in the Australian Supreme court and, on Thursday, Aug. 31, a ruling was announced that the Postal Survey can proceed – since they promised to keep the price below $122M AUD. So now there will be an official nation-wide vote about changing this law (non-binding). Kol Habizayon.

On Sept. 4, the Rabbinical Council of Victoria (RCV) issued a statement encouraging “citizens” to vote ‘no’ to reforming the Australia Marriage laws. And all Tahom Rabba broke loose.

Incidentally, this statement cannot be found on the RCV website, nor on its Facebook page.

Evidently, there was an enormous backlash. Where did this backlash come from?

I can tell you this. It wasn’t from non-Jews and it wasn’t from straight Torah observant Jews.

And this backlash was so strong that it sent the president of the RCV, Rabbi Daniel Rabin, reeling. Two days later he issued a personal apology on his own Facebook page. This is very strange because the RCV itself as a body did not formally retract the statement. This was a personal apology which said, among other things, “The RCV should not have told people how to vote and refrained from making a divisive statement.” So this fellow is rebuking the statement of the RCV and said it shouldn’t have been issued - but he is the president that issued it!

Now, I’ve been advising the Australian Rabbinical councils (RCANZ and RCV) to refrain from making divisive statements since last June. They are very slow learners. But I digress...

Is this a retraction or not? If it is, we are looking at a Rabbinic body that is charged with leading the masses that has issued a statement which, in the main, is meant to reflect Jewish Halachic values - and they need to retract it?? (Or, if it wasn’t retracted – their own president has to personally apologize for it??)

Incidentally, it seems that the Vice President of the RCV, Rabbi Ralph Genende, actually resigned over this.

In my humble opinion, this statement was very appropriate but the opening paragraph was grossly misworded. Firstly, it definitely should not have targeted “citizens” as if to imply "Australians" - Jews and non-Jews alike. The statement should only address the constituents of the RCV. I think it was this blunder that gave the “Orthodox” Community Centre Ark Centre and the Caulfield Shule the impetus to publicly oppose it. Secondly, assuming it is a reflection of Halachic guidance, it should have been more resolute. (And, if it wasn’t Halachic guidance, they had no business issuing it.)

The first paragraph should have said something closer to this:


The RCV states that Orthodox Jewish Halacha does not recognize or sanction same-sex marriages. According to Talmudic and Midrashic sources, this practice is forbidden for Jews and Noahides. We urge all Jews and Noahides loyal to Halacha and Jewish tradition to vote accordingly.

Of course this comes across a bit firm, but Halacha is very firm. The point is once we narrow down the target audience to those who are actually interested in Halachic guidance, it is not too firm at all. (The rest of the statement softens it up, anyway.)

In any case, the RCV is reeling. They got into Tahom Rabba way over their heads. And why?

We have noticed, now and in the past, that the Australian Rabbinical councils are not interested in standing up for Halacha. Such a stance would result in their constituency shrinking to only include Jews who actually want to adhere to the Halacha. They are interested in “reaching out” to encompass the largest possible constituency even at the price of extreme compromises in Halacha. Instead of reducing their constituency to conform with upholding the Halacha, they feel it is wiser to expand the Halacha to conform to the “sensitivities” of a larger constituency. They call this being “progressive”. We call this being “regressive”.

למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה

As it stands, I saw in one report that besides Rabbi Rabin, at least six other RCV member Rabbis “distanced” themselves from this statement. Makes me ask: “Who approved of this statement to start with?"

The only member Rabbi who seems to have his eyes in his head and understand what's going on – and seems to have resigned – is Rabbi Chaim Cowen. He wrote (emphasis mine):


Taking a public position against the RCV on a matter which is clearly stipulated in Torah and codified by the Rambam, embraces a corrosive groupthink mentality which seems to be concerned more with popularity than integrity and fidelity to our Divine mandate.

Hey, I could have written that. As a matter of fact, I did (although on a different subject) – right HERE.

Now that I mention it, where are my friends from the RCANZ in all this?

They are quite vocally silent.

Rabbi Kennard disassociates himself from the statement and regards it as “wrong in itself.” Both he and Rabbi Mirvis say that it is not their role as a Rabbi to tell people how to vote. I don’t know about Rabbi Mirvis, but Rabbi Kennard has gotten a ton of flak for not coming out in support of a Yes vote. Rabbi Shamir Caplan (both RCV and RCANZ) did indeed write a letter to support those who “Orthodox Jews” who wish to vote Yes. Although it looks like he wouldn’t vote Yes himself, or at least he acknowledges this lifestyle as problematic, he understands that a Yes vote can be seen as a defense of Freedom of Religion.

Have LGBTQI philosophies become a religion?

Rav Yaakov Glasman has denied any personal involvement in this statement and does not want to support it. He states: “I believe the statement was ill-conceived and served no purpose in advancing the cause of Orthodox Judaism. “

As stated above, I agree with him due to the way it was written. But, I must comment, that he and his organization (RCANZ) are no strangers to ill-conceived statements that serve no purpose in advancing the cause of Orthodox Judaism.

He does indeed refer us to some earlier statements. He writes:  Our position on traditional marriage and the exemptions we expect for religious institutions should the Marriage Act be amended was submitted to the Government in January as part of the Senate’s Exposure Draft into the Marriage Amendment Bill. 

There were two statements issued in January. They can both be downloaded HERE as Submissions #128 and #133.

The first submission is #128 signed by Rabbi Dr. Benjami Elton. As Rabbi Glasman notes, it focuses on the need for religious institutions to be exempt from enforcement.  This is a very appropriate statement but it opens our eyes to a scary truth. There is something at stake here for the religious community. This statement discusses the idea of “Ministers of Religions” to be forced by law to officiate at these ceremonies. It does not mention a few other similar hazards such as schools being required to include same-sex relationship education in their science or social studies and the lawsuits against bakers for refusing to bake wedding cakes with same-sex motifs.

This puts to rest the notion that this is exclusively a civil matter and that religious bodies have no grounds to voice their opinions. These were the “justifications" for “Orthodox” bodies such as the JCC Ark Centre and Caulfield Shule and scores of commenters on numerous Facebook sites to object to the  RCV statement.

The second statement is Submission #133 and I am greatly disturbed by it. At the end of the statement it states:


At the same time, RCANZ and RCV reaffirms Judaism's fundamental obligation to respect and embrace all people irrespective of their sexuality and condemns in the strongest possible terms words or actions intended to denigrate or hurt others.

I don’t mean to be harsh (though I have a reputation for harshness to uphold) and I hate to say this but…there is no fundamental obligation in Judaism to embrace all people irrespective of their sexuality…

In some cases it’s a good idea and appropriate to embrace these people and in some cases it is not. It depends on how sincere they are and if their actions can be deemed harmful to society at large or to individuals. Moshe tells us that if one is raveh – i.e. shogeg, involuntary, under duress, ”inebriated”, contrite and respectful then HKBH is willing to be “maavir” (forgiving). But if one is tzme’ah - provocative, callous, audacious, agenda-driven, self-serving, hedonistic, “sober” and a toevah, we must distance ourselves from them and cast them from our midst. We have no choice.  This is not out of bigotry or spite and it’s not out of vigilantism (which doesn’t seem to bother RCANZ anyway) and it’s not because we want to. It’s because we have to. We have to be a Mamleches Kohanim and a Goy Kadosh.

But it’s not just us. It’s all of mankind. The Midrash Rabba indicates that nothing angers HKBH more than legitimizing degenerate behavior with same-sex marriage singled out as a dealbreaker. This is not a “civil” issue or a “religious” issue. This is an existential issue and an apocalyptic issue. This is at a Whole Nother Level.

ורבצה בו כל האלה הכתובה בספר הזה.

May HKBH save us from the coming tsunami... because the Rabbinical Councils of Australia certainly will not.

V'Lo Tavee Toeivay El Beisecha - V'Hayisa Cheirem Kamohu

WE PROTEST

We, the undersigned Jewish bloggers, hereby protest – in the strongest terms possible – the parading and glorification of an “alternative lifestyle”, one that is classified in the Holy Torah as an abomination, especially through the streets of the holy city of Jerusalem. 

The Torah demands that we live by a certain code of sexual morality, and as such, we are forbidden from certain relationships that a moral society cannot tolerate.  These include incest, adultery, bestiality, and homosexuality.  All these are considered grave sins in Judaism and incur the punishment of Karet, or excision from the Jewish people.  An act performed with witnesses during the time of the Sanhedrin would incur an even worse consequence – namely, capital punishment. 

And this is only on an individual level.  When the sin is committed on a societal level, it is much worse.  The Torah and our sages record how these acts were catalysts for both the Great Flood during Noah’s lifetime and the destruction of the Five Cities of the Plain.

As such, we consider any attempt to glorify acts that the Torah vehemently forbids by parading any such lifestyle through the streets with horror and utter disdain.  Such parades in New York and San Francisco would be bad enough, but through the streets of the Holy Land of Israel is a thousand-fold worse.  The Torah specifically warns us not to act in sexually abominable ways lest we be vomited out of the land.  One can only imagine how it is viewed in Heaven when people brazenly display to G-d how abominable one can be.  And if the Land of Israel cannot tolerate such acts of utter gall, all the more so in the holy city of Jerusalem, a city that is overwhelmingly religious. 

We in no way wish to minimize the struggles in temptation some may have in this area and view with positivity those who have such inclinations and bravely overcome them.  But those are not the people irreverently parading through the streets with rainbow flags, who show utter contempt for the Holy Torah and all we hold dear.

We therefore vehemently protest the “Pride” Parade in Jerusalem and everywhere else in the world where they may occur.  We hope and pray that those who take part in such parades do a complete Teshuva for their actions, and may we see a rebuilt Jerusalem, speedily in our days, Amen.

Signed,
(in alphabetical order)

CDG from Hava HaAharona

Cosmic X from Cosmic X in Jerusalem

Dassie from Myrtle Rising

Devash from Tomer Devorah

Dov Bar Leib from End of Days


Goldie ZP from Geula613

Rabbi Lazer Brody from Lazer Beams

Yaak from Yeranen Yaakov

Yechezkel Hirshman from Achas L'Maala V'Sheva L'Matta

Wednesday, August 1, 2018

Techeiles 1 – 'Shtimming" with Chazal


In my previous post, I was honored to receive comments from a single “Anonymous” commenter. This commenter took issue with my statement that my son Eli wears techeiles. He very adamantly stated that it is not techeiles – just blue strings.

He offered no proof but merely relayed that this is the opinion of two very renowned talmidei chachamim. One being mori v’rabi HRHG Rav Asher Zelig Weiss, Shlita and the other is the Rosh Yeshiva of Torah Vodaath, HRHG Rav Yisroel Reisman, Shlita.

I was previously aware of the fact the Rav Asher Weiss, Shlita is not very enthusiastic about the murex trunculus. But, to my knowledge, he hasn’t openly explained his basis for rejecting it. Harav Reisman, Shlita, is much more outspoken. As the anonymous commenter indicated, he has indeed stated that, in his opinion, the murex trunculus has a 0% chance of fitting the bill for the Talmudic chilazon. (Listen to it HERE) 

My own position is what is probably that of most neutral people – passive acceptance. The murex  could be the correct chilazon and it could be not – at least 50/50, but it is definitely the front running candidate from all the contenders that we know of.  I personally lean toward acceptance since this creature is here and known, it has a confirmed history as a source of dye material and it works. None of this can be denied by anyone.

By flat out rejecting the murex trunculus, Harav Reisman is telling us that the Talmudic chilazon is some phantom creature that is lurking out there but this creature – or its dyeing capabilities – has not yet been “discovered”. Of course, such a thing is possible. But, unless we say that this creature is divinely concealed, it does not seem very likely in today’s world of advanced knowledge about the creatures of the world – be it land or marine.

It looks like Harav Reisman is saying that, in his opinion, the odds of the murex trunculus being the Talmudic chilazon is 0% and the odds of it being some divinely concealed creature is 100%. I think this is what one might call lopsided odds.

Now, the purpose of this post is not to fight for the authenticity of the murex. I have absolutely nothing to add to the existing literature on the subject put forth by the proponents and that is readily available on the Internet.  What is bothering me is the “0%” absoluteness of Rav Reisman’s position (Harav Asher Weiss what not nearly so absolute). This is because this subject brings us into a more existential realm of debate – the absoluteness of the words of Chazal.

Rav Reisman asserts that the murex trunculus has a 0% chance of being the Talmudic chilazon. And why?

Because, in his view, the murex is not a perfect match to the creature described by Chazal. Indeed, most of the literature (or sound-bites) emitted by all sides in the debate focuses on how closely the known candidates line up with the descriptions in Chazal. And the question is: how much do they have to?

Or, in other words, how precise is Chazal?

Before anyone takes a position on the murex trunculus, one must have a position on how to understand Chazal. Rav Reisman says the murex does not “shtim” (concur) with Chazal. The question remains, to what extent must it shtim with Chazal? How far off is it from other things that don’t shtim with chazal? Does the observable condition (metzius) always shtim with Chazal?

Does Chazal always shtim with Chazal?

In my youth, all of the fanciful teachings of Chazal were presented as immutable fact to be accepted at face value. The Leviim, or at least Moshe and Aharon, were 10 amos tall. Batya’s arm stretched out for several yards. HKBH picked up Har Sinai and held it over the heads of the nation like a barrel. 40 days before a baby is born, his destined wife is announced. Etc., etc. This is our tradition. There is nothing to debate.

But as we get a bit older and used to critical thinking we discover that things that Chazal say do not always “shtim”. In some cases they do not shtim with what we can observe – the “metzius”. In other cases they do not shtim with basic logic. And in some cases, they don’t shtim with other things that were said by Chazal. For those who firmly believe that the words of Chazal are immutable, Chazal themselves throw us a few curve balls.

Before we go on, we need to discuss the components of Chazal. The literature of Chazal comes in two flavors: Halacha and Aggadata. Halacha is law and Aggadata is philosophy and legend.

Halacha is relatively straightforward:  You can recite Shema all night long, but the Chachamim have your back and tell you to get it done before Chatzos. The night before Pesach we check our houses using a candle. Reuven’s ox gores Shimon’s ox, Reuven will pay for all of Shimon’s ox or half of Shimon’s ox or none of Shimon’s ox, whatever.

It tells us what we expect to hear.

Aggadata is much trickier and esoteric. It tells us things we would never expect to hear. And it presents us with details and “realities” that we cannot observe or verify. It is the basis of our faith, but, at times, it is also a test of our faith.

The great meforshim – the GR”A, Maharsha, Maharal, Ben Ish Chai, and countless others tell us that we cannot always take the words of Aggadata at face value. Parts of it are exclusively to be seen as allegorical. There is no way to look at them as actual events. Other parts, although perhaps defining a true event, are greatly exaggerated in terms of numerical quantities, sizes and dimensions.

As long as the Halacha and Aggadata do not meet, we can take each variety for what it’s worth. We live by the decrees of Halacha and the teachings of the Aggadata shape our perception and character, but as for its veracity, we can take it or leave it. We don’t have to take it all seriously.

Or do we?

Chazal take the words of Aggadata very seriously. So seriously that it is often used to support concepts of Halacha. And, when this happens, we can get very flustered. There are quite of few examples, but I only want to mention a few.

The first example of Chazal basing a Halacha on an Aggadata is a well-known story in the last perek of Sanhedrin (Cheilek) which is distinguished as being the only perek in Shas which is almost nothing but Aggadata.

The opening Mishna tells us that three Jewish kings lost their share in the World to Come, one of whom is Menashe ben Chizkiah. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 102b) tells us that Rav Ashi was about to teach about these kings. He announced to his students, “Tomorrow we will deal with our comrades who lost their share in the World to Come…”

That night, King Menashe appeared to him in a dream. He chastised Rav Ashi, “Do you dare consider me a comrade to you or to your father? Do you know at what part of the loaf one must cut the Hamotzi?” Rav Ashi conceded that he did not know and if Menashe will teach him, he will say it over in the class in his name. Menashe told him it is from the part that is the first to harden when it is baked.

There is a bit more to the story but this much serves our purposes. The point is that Chazal take this other-worldy communication very seriously and they establish the Halacha exactly as dictated by Menashe – in a dream.

Many meforshim ask numerous questions on this Aggadata. The most common one is: Why did Menashe choose this particular Halacha as his test to Rav Ashi? Both the Maharsha and the Toras Chaim present intriguing hidden messages that this particular Halacha is meant to relay.

But there are numerous questions nobody seems to ask. Primarily, why is there no mention of this story or this Halacha in all of masechet Brachos where these Halachos are discussed? Also, Rav Ashi was from the last generation of Amoraim. Actually, he and Ravina were the final editors of the Talmud Bavli. This augments the above question even more – Rav Ashi “wrote” the Talmud. He wrote this Aggadata in Sanhedrin. Apparently, no sage was aware of it until then. Why did he put it only in Sanhedrin. Why not also in Berachos? Why should anyone study Berachos and make a siyum and not know about this Halacha until he reaches the end of Sanhedrin (assuming he does)? Isn’t Rav Ashi aware that there are many Aggadaphobes who do not study Aggadata and may never really study Cheilek?

More seriously, I mentioned that Rav Ashi was “sof horaah”. He knew all of Shas, even the part that came after Rav and Shmuel and Abaye and Rava. If he didn’t know this Halacha prior to his dream, then nobody did.

Are we supposed to learn Halacha from dreams? Do we not assume that every Halacha stated by a Tanna or Amora was learned from his Rebbe and on upward to Moshe and Yehoshua (despite all the chalukei deos)? How could such a simple – and somewhat logical – Halacha be totally unknown? Where did Menashe get it from? Did he learn it from his rebbe or did he just dream it up (like Rav Ashi)? How did it get forgotten? Why did it get forgotten? 

And what would be if King Menashe would have chosen a totally different subject to test the acumen of Rav Ashi? Does this mean that this Halacha would be concealed from us forever?

I am quite mystified over all of this, but one thing is clear. The lines between Halacha and Aggadata are suddenly very blurry.

The next, and starkest example of these blurred lines, is the sugya in Zevachim 113. The gemara tries to set a Halachic premise on a serious issue – do we need to be concerned about impurity from long deeply buried unknown remains of ancient dead bodies (tumas tahom) that may exist in any part of Eretz Yisrael?  

As usual, this is a Halachic dispute; in this case, between Rabi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. The gemara states that the premise of this dispute hinges on whether the Great Noahide Flood also affected the land of Israel. If it did, we need to assume that the remains of the dead may be buried at any place so there is a concern for tumas tehom. If it did not, then we do not need to assume that any open spot may be a hidden grave. Hence, one sage (Reish Lakish) holds the flood did include Eretz Yisrael and the other sage (Rabi Yochanan) holds it did not.

At one point, the gemara wants to challenge the stringent opinion (Reish Lakish) and it asks: if there was no flood in Eretz Yisrael, we understand how the Re’em survived the flood. It spent the year in E”Y (the “gap” year). But like the opinion that there was a flood in E”Y, the Re’em had no place of refuge. So how did it survive?

What creature are we discussing? Why wouldn’t it be on the ark like all the other creatures?

The gemara itself addresses this question and clarifies that we are talking about the great Re’em (mountain goat) that was described in the tall tales of Rabba Bar Chana in the fifth Perek of Bava Basra.

To answer the survival question, the gemara initially suggests it was only a baby Re’em and Noah could fit it on the ark. But then the gemara rejects this answer because, according to the gemara in Bava Basra, the one day old Re’em was three parsaos at the neck and its head was 1.5 parsaos high (note - a parsah is 8000 amos which, like Rav Chaim Na’eh is about 4000 meters which is 13,123 feet or a drop less than half of Mount Everest). So the gemara finally concludes that it stuck the tip of its nose into the ark and thereby survived the flood.

Reish Lakish has been vindicated! That was a close one!

Of course, one obvious question is why don’t we simply answer that this immense creature climbed up one of the mountains and was able to tower above the 11 amos that the water overlapped the mountains? Actually, by the dimensions given, it would not even need to climb at all. It could stand on the ground and still tower over the water.

Nobody seems bothered by this question. This may be because there is a much bigger question: Is it not the virtually unanimous position of the Rishonim and Achronim that the events and creatures described in the fifth perk of Bava Basra are merely allegorical and parables for hidden insights, and they don’t (and can’t) truly exist?

Rav Yosef Chaim of Bagdad – the Ben Yehoyada – asks this question and he can only conclude that there is no Halachic validity to this segment of the gemara and it was only included to sharpen the wits of students.

This basically means that we need to discount this entire segment as “window dressing”! 
This is not a comfortable concept for those of us who would like to think that Chazal do not pull our legs. What’s more, there is no indication from the text of the gemara that Chazal are anything but totally serious.

My last witness (before we adjourn) is the gemara in Sanhedrin 69b.

Remember my previous posts where I mentioned that if a young lady was molested by a father, brother, or non-Jew, she is invalidated to a Cohen? Well, this gemara goes another step further. If a married woman is unclothed and is “playing” with her young son of about 8 years old and his organ (erect) makes incidental contact with hers, is this considered sexual contact to invalidate her to her husband if he is a Cohen?

This question makes a world of difference in Halacha whenever it happens!

The gemara says that this is a dispute between Bais Hillel (lenient) and Bais Shammai (stringent). The gemara goes on to say that if the child is already nine years old, all sides are stringent because this is called sexual contact. If the child is less than eight, all sides are lenient. They only argue between the ages of eight and nine because, even though Chazal have ruled that in their time (and our time) a boy below nine is not virile, in Biblical times it seems that even an eight year old was virile. Bais Shammai holds that we set the Halacha based on Biblical times and not the times of Chazal. Bais Hillel holds we stick to the present.

But how do Chazal determine that Biblical times were different?

Chazal present a long list of scriptures from Shmuel B that proves that Bat Sheva was the granddaughter of Achitofel and Shlomo was Bat Sheva’s son and that Achitofel only died when Shlomo was seven years old.  All this is proven from scripture. As far as we know from scripture, Achitofel could have been quite an old man.

Then the gemara throws us a bombshell that has no source in the pasuk except from an Aggadic teaching (drashat Chazal) from a vague pasuk in Tehillim 55. This Aggadic teaching says that Achitofel was no older than 33 when he died. If Shlomo was already seven years old, it emerges that Achitofel was 26 when his great grandchild, Shlomo, was born.  Since the minimum gestation period for each descendant (Eliam, Bat Sheva, and Shlomo) would be about 7 months each (21 total) the gemara wants to allow two years for the three gestations which only leave 24 years for the three generations. Thus, the gemara concludes that each ancestor – Achitofel, Eliam, and Bat Sheva was a mere eight years old when they begat the next generation. This proves that in Biblical times a man was virile even at eight and based on this, Bais Shammai would forbid the woman to her husband.

This is all contingent on a Braitha of Chazal that states that Achitofel was only 33 when he died! There is no proof to this in scripture.

The gemara subsequently dismisses this proof by suggesting that one of the ancestors – Bat Sheva – is indeed female and females work differently. Perhaps she was only six years old when she gave birth to Shlomo (Dovid HaMelech was 58, by the way) so the male ancestors may have been a full nine years old like in today’s times. Subsequently, the gemara finds a proof from another source.

But… if not for the fact that Bat Sheva was female, the gemara would have upheld it’s proof based on this Braitha. The Braitha is inviolable. Chazal take their Aggadatas very, very seriously.

We are not finished with this Braitha. This very same Braitha is going to cause us even more trouble in the next segment of this series which in turn, would throw this entire proof to the wolves (if it weren’t anyhow dismissed).

So thus far we have seen that Chazal take their own Aggadatas at face value. So it makes sense that we, and of course, great Torah scholars like Rav Yisroel Reisman, Shlita, do the same.

However the GR”A, Maharal, Ben Ish Chai, Maharsha and others point out that this cannot be relied upon as a given. And, quite often, normal critical thinking forces us to make exceptions. 
All of the above was only the introduction. There is more confusion to come.
Stay tuned…

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